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ABSTRACT 
 
ESSAYS ON UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN INDONESIA 
Caroline Ly 
Mark V. Pauly 
The government of Indonesia aims to achieve Universal Health Coverage by 2019 
through the consolidation of fragmented schemes and the expansion of coverage to 
nonpoor informal sector populations through partially subsidized premiums.  In doing so, 
Indonesia faces a challenge common to developing countries of trying to cover its large 
informal sector population.  Based on data up through 2015, we analyze multiple 
dimensions of this coverage problem.  Chapter One looks at the non-price determinants 
of enrollment for the large informal sector population to understand why less than 19 
percent of the nonpoor informal sector are enrolled in SHI.  Chapter Two uses 
propensity score matching with difference in difference analysis and exploits the 
differential payroll tax imposed by marital status to analyze the social health insurance 
reform’s impact on the formal sector labor market.  Chapter Three compares naïve 
models and models that address potential endogeneity to look at the health utilization, 
financial protection, and health outcome impacts among the nonpoor informal sector.  
The reform resulted in a 1.6 percentage point increase in informal employment relative 
to a counterfactual decreasing trend in informalization.  It increased public outpatient 
utilization but did not improve financial protection or health outcomes.  Short of 
increasing resources to provide more generous resources, cost-sharing requirements 
and redesigning benefits packages coupled with investments in health sector inputs 
might enhance the demand for publicly provided health care services and address SHI 
deficits. 
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PREFACE  
With Universal Health Coverage enshrined as an aspirational Sustainable Development Goal and 
starting at USAID under the previous administration, I adopted the premise that the global health 
community should be working to advance UHC.  But it was clear that this aspirational goal is 
fraught with challenges.  Most developing countries cannot afford universal primary health care 
for all its citizens at the cost of US$86 per capita (Chatham House 2014).  Country governments 
also face many competing development objectives that require investments in other non-health 
sectors.  To give a proper accounting of the investment case for UHC, country’s own pathways to 
achieving UHC need to be carefully considered within the context of the benefits it provides to a 
country’s citizens relative to a comprehensive set of costs that include the direct costs on the 
health sector as well as the indirect costs on the economy.   
This purpose of this dissertation is to revisit some of the basic assumptions behind UHC and 
examine the impact of Indonesia’s own goals to achieve UHC through the Social Health 
Insurance reform introduced in 2014.  It focuses on the country’s large informal sector, which has 
been difficult to reach in Indonesia and in many other developing countries. The three chapters in 
this dissertation looks at the rate of social health insurance uptake by the nonpoor informal 
sector, how the social health insurance revenue collection system imposed on the formal sector 
may impact the overall labor market, and the impact of the social health insurance reform on 
health care utilization, financial protection and health outcomes.
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
The non-price determinants of demand for social health insurance among 
the nonpoor informal sector 
 
1.1 Overview:  Research question and significance 
Achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is one of the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDG 3.8) ratified by over 140 countries.  UHC is defined as the result in which a 
health system allows all people who need health services to receive them without undue 
financial hardship (WHO 2010).  The government of Indonesia has ratified the SDGs and 
is undertaking a major health insurance reform as part of its own goals to achieve UHC.  
The Minister of Health of Indonesia wrote in a commentary that it aims to “create a well-
integrated, sustainable, accessible, and equitable health system that provides 
comprehensive, high-quality care to all Indonesians” by making enrollment mandatory 
for the entire population by 2019 (Mboi 2015).   
In attempting to achieve UHC, Indonesia faces the “missing middle” problem of providing 
coverage for its middle-class populations, comprised primarily of large informal sector 
populations.   This is a challenge common to many developing countries that are 
undertaking reforms to achieve UHC.  The informal sector, which makes up more than 
half of the global workforce, comprises workers, self-employed individuals, and their 
dependents who do not pay taxes and bypass government business regulations.  As a 
result, the informal sector tends to lack access to formal social protection mechanisms.   
A review of case studies of countries’ approaches to achieving UHC have found that the 
size of the informal sector is negatively correlated with UHC population coverage rates 
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(Cotlear et al. 2015).   Countries like Thailand that rely on general revenue financing to 
generously subsidize the informal sector have made more progress in achieving UHC 
(Cotlear et al. 2015).  Countries that rely on contributory financing mechanisms tend to 
achieve partial population coverage, leaving large swathes of the informal sector 
uninsured.  By comparison, Indonesia fully subsidizes enrollment for the poor/near poor 
but only partially subsidizes coverage for the remaining nonpoor informal sector.   
In 2014, Indonesia launched a reform to merge fragmented health risk pools for the 
poor/near poor (Askeskin), civil service (Askes), provinces (Jamkesda), and private 
formal sector (Jamsostek) into the Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN) social health 
insurance system managed by the social security agency, Badan Penyelenggara 
Jaminan Sosial (BPJS).  It also opened enrollment of JKN to the remaining population 
who could not access care through one of the other risk pool categories.   This 
remaining population is henceforth referred to as the nonpoor informal sector.   
Specifically, this group is comprised of those who are not employed in the formal sector, 
are not dependents of a formal sector worker, or qualify as poor or near-poor.  The 
nonpoor informal sector can now purchase a comparable benefits package through a 
contributory financing mechanism.  The government of Indonesia has articulated its aim 
to achieve UHC.  The Minister of Health of Indonesia wrote in a commentary that it aims 
to “create a well-integrated, sustainable, accessible, and equitable health system that 
provides comprehensive, high-quality care to all Indonesians” by making enrollment 
mandatory for the entire population by 2019 (Mboi 2015).   
Despite the mandate, Indonesia faces the risk of not achieving UHC due to its large 
informal sector population which makes up over half the workforce (Dartanto 2017).  
According to insurance data from December 2017, just over 70 percent of the population 
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is insured (BPJS 2018), but only about 18.7 percent of the nonpoor informal sector is 
enrolled (Dartanto et al. 2016).   This sector pays premiums based on the class of health 
care service that they choose to access, not based on their actuarial risk.  Compared to 
their formal sector peers, this premium level is a nominal amount; it also falls below the 
average per beneficiary cost of services.  A large portion of the informal sector, the 
poorest 40 percent of the population, is entitled to full subsidies for coverage under the 
social health insurance.  Thus far, fiscal constraints limit the government’s ability to 
expand these subsidies to the nonpoor informal sector.       
To move ahead on UHC and minimize the fiscal impact associated with expanding the 
subsidy system, this chapter asks what are the non-price determinants of demand 
among the nonpoor informal sector for the social health insurance system in Indonesia?  
A complete assessment of the demand for health insurance would require data on price 
variation, which is unavailable for this analysis.  Using a probit model on household 
survey data, this analysis finds the influence of socio-demographic, health-related and 
community factors on enrollment.  These factors will also be used as part of the 
identification strategy to assess the impact of the reform on health, health care 
utilization, and financial protection in a subsequent chapter. 
1.2 Institutional Background: Indonesia’s health insurance reform 
Indonesia is the fourth largest country with a population of 260 million distributed over 
900 islands. It is a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of $3,570 and a 
declining extreme poverty rate that stands at 6.8% (of the population below $1.90 a day 
in 2011 PPP).  Indonesians experience wide geographic and socio-economic inequities, 
evidenced by a 2016 Gini coefficient of 0.39 (BPS 2018).  Inequities are also evident in 
health care outcomes and access across wealth and region.  The poorest Indonesians 
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have an infant mortality rate (52 per 1,000 live births) that is three times higher than 
those in the wealthiest quintile (DHS 2012).  Yogyakarta, a special region in Java, 
comes closest to universal childhood vaccinations (93.5%).  By comparison, Papua has 
a childhood vaccination rate of 34 percent (DHS 2012).       
Indonesia’s governance of the health sector has evolved with the country’s changing 
political and economic environment.   This resulted in the piecemeal development of 
fragmented risk pools comprised of different sub-populations organized by income, 
employment and regional groupings; these have since been merged into one pool under 
the 2014 health reform (see Table 1.1).  Pisani et al. (2017) have described the historic 
steps that have led to the 2014 reform. In the late 1960s, after coming to power, 
President Suharto increased investments in infrastructure included expanding primary 
health care services.  For his military and Javanese civil service who supported his rise 
to power, he expanded health insurance through a government program called Askes.  
At the same time, the Ministry of Labor was focused on strengthening its domestic labor 
force which led to the introduction of a separate health insurance program for the private 
formal sector, later named Jamsostek.   Nevertheless, enrollment in Jamsostek 
remained limited and ended up feeding into President Suharto’s patronage system.   
The Asian Financial Crisis brought an end to the Suharto regime and ushered in major 
national reforms including in the health sector.   To mitigate the social unrest resulting 
from the crisis, new social protection mechanisms were introduced such as a health card 
program which exempted the poor from paying for public primary health care.   In 2001, 
the government decentralized decision-making for many sectors including health, 
resulting in the devolution of power and budgets to around 300 district governments.     
In response to this decentralization, some local governments effectively created their 
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own schemes to provide subsidized coverage for their poor populations.   Recognizing 
the political popularity of these local programs and the leaders who were responsible for 
their development, the central government undertook efforts to re-centralize some health 
functions.  This included the expansion of central schemes to ensure coverage for the 
poor that took elements from the health care program and the local insurance schemes.  
Through legislation in 2004, the Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional (SJSN) law provided 
the legal basis for providing social protection for Indonesians.  In 2005, the central 
Askeskin program was created under the civil service insurer, PT Askes to provide 
coverage for the poor.   Further fragmenting the system, the management 
responsibilities of the Askeskin program was moved under the Ministry of Health and 
later renamed Jamkesmas.  In 2011, the BPJS law decreed that all contributory and 
non-contributory social health insurance schemes be merged under a single-payer 
system beginning in 2014 (see table 1.1).  This led to the institutionalization of the BPJS 
Kesehatan, the health insurance administrator for the unified health insurance program, 
JKN (World Bank 2016). 
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Table 1.1.   Pre-reform government-controlled health financing programs 
Scheme Beneficiaries Financing 
mechanism 
Benefit 
package 
Providers Reimbursement 
PT Askes civil servants 
general and 
payroll taxes 
comprehensive 
public and 
some 
private 
capitation 
PT Asabri military 
general taxes 
and user fees 
primary, 
secondary, and 
tertiary 
military 
providers 
and public 
hospitals 
centrally 
allocated 
budgets 
Jamsostek 
formal 
workers 
payroll 
contributions 
comprehensive 
secondary and 
tertiary 
public and 
private 
ffs 
Askeskin/ 
Jamkesmas 
poor general taxes 
comprehensive 
across all levels 
public drugs 
Jampersal 
maternal and 
child health 
care program 
general taxes 
deliveries, pre-
and post-natal 
care 
public and 
maternity 
hospitals 
fee schedule 
Jamkesda 
local 
government 
programs 
local 
government 
revenues 
varies public 
local budget 
allocation 
Source: Modified from Trisnantoro (2014) 
The reform combined the different schemes and opened access to the nonpoor informal 
sector under the JKN.  It is still funded through a mix of different financing mechanisms 
comprised of general revenues, premium contributions, and payroll taxes.  Each of the 
financing mechanisms is based on three major categories of members, described below 
(Hidayat 2015).   
1) The Peneriman Bantuan Iuran (PBI) are poor/near poor Indonesians who are fully 
subsidized by the government.  The central government (during the period of 
study) transferred Rupiah (Rp) 19,225 (US$1.4) per member per month to the 
BPJS.  Subsidy payments for this group were recently increased to about Rp 
27,500 (US$2) per member per month to address deficits resulting from the 
insufficient subsidy transfer.  The numbers of poor/near poor who qualify for free 
insurance are all pre-identified up to a certain quota, established by sub-region.  
This population is identified through a registry of eligible Indonesians, maintained 
by the Ministry of Social Affairs through proxy means-testing indicators to estimate 
 
 
7 
 
consumption using data from their SUSENAS survey.  There is no single national 
threshold for establishing eligibility.  A quota of eligible beneficiaries is set at the 
district level (World Bank 2016).  There may be eligibility leakages resulting from 
mis-identification of those who qualify for the fully subsidized coverage available 
to the poor/near poor.  Analysis on Jamkesmas found that only 47 percent of the 
Jamkesmas cardholders were considered poor or near poor (Harimurti 2013).   
2) Salaried formal sector employees in the public and private sector who pay five 
percent of their salary (four percent from employer and one percent from 
employee) with a monthly cap of Rp 400,000/month (US$ 29.11) (PwC 2016).  Prior 
to the reform the formal sector was subject to a payroll tax borne by employers for 
social security that included health care benefits.  For the health portion the tax 
was three percent for single people and six percent for married people with 
respective caps of Rp 141,750 (US$ 14) per month and Rp 283,500 (US$ 28) per 
month (PwC 2013)2.    The formal sector comprises of government and private 
employees.  According to the IFLS V data, most or 80 percent of government 
employees have enrolled in the social health insurance whereas only about 58 
percent of private formal sector employees have enrolled in any type of insurance.  
This may be indicative of the inability to enforce mandatory insurance even among 
the formal sector.   
3) The nonpoor informal sector, unemployed, and self-employed pay one of three 
fixed premium levels per month depending on tier of hospital ward.   The premiums 
vary as follows: Class III premiums are Rp 25,500 (US$ 1.9) which provide access 
to hospital rooms with more than five beds, class II premiums are Rp 42,500 (US$ 
                                                          
1 Based on 2015 mid-year Indonesia Rp to US$ exchange rates 
2 Based on 2013 mid-year Indonesia Rp to US$ exchange rates  
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3) for hospital rooms with two to five beds, or class I premiums are Rp 59,500 (US$ 
4.3) for hospital rooms with fewer than two beds1.  The highest tier of hospital ward 
is also provided to formal sector enrollees.  Potential members can enroll either 
online or in-person in banks and offices (JLN 2015).  The estimate of the entire 
informal sector workforce varies, depending on the data source, but estimates 
suggest that it comprises of up to two-thirds of the workforce.    According to the 
most recent data, the insurance covers only 25.4 million self-employed 
beneficiaries (BPJS 2018). 
Each of the eligibility classes has a different funding source based on a payroll tax for 
the formal sector, a fixed flat rate that varies by hospital class for the informal sector, and 
a subsidy financed by general revenues available to the poor/near poor.   The size of the 
government subsidies for the poor, the informal sector contributions, and the payroll 
contributions are not linked to estimated costs of providing care.   An analysis of early 
enrollment, revenue, and claims data show the incomplete enrollment among the formal 
and informal sector and the mis-match in the revenues collected and average health 
care costs paid out by the social health insurance system (see table 1.2).   The 2014 
early enrollment figures illustrate the challenges of enforcing enrollment even among the 
formal sector, which achieved less than half coverage of the eligible population.  The 
informal sector performed worse, enrolling only 13 percent during this early 
implementation period.   This initial data also illustrates the average premiums collected 
by the BPJS and the average costs incurred by the BPJS for each eligibility category.  
The poor/near poor categories bring in the least per capita revenue but also incurs the 
least cost.  The formal sector brings in the most per capita revenue, but its excess 
average claims result in losses for the BPJS.   For the informal sector, average per 
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capita claims are over six times its average per capita premiums paid.  This has been 
interpreted as an indication of adverse selection among the informal sector.  That is, the 
early adopters of insurance among the informal sector are sicker and require more 
medical care than the average member of the informal sector.   
Given the differential in costs and premiums, deficits by the social health insurance 
system have been reported.  In 2014, the program experienced a deficit of Rp 3.3 trillion 
(US$ 224 million) or 6 percent and 2 percent of total SHI and government health 
spending, respectively.  It was projected to experience a cumulative deficit of Rp 96.2 
trillion (US$ 7 billion) rupiah by 2019 (Rachman 2015, Hidayat 2015).    Recently, the 
government increased the subsidy it pays on behalf of poor enrollees from Rp 19,225 
(US$ 1.4) per capita per month to Rp 27,500 (US$ 2) per capita per month.  It also 
revised the premium schedule for the nonpoor informal sector in 2016.  It is unclear what 
impact this has had on the financial sustainability of the insurance scheme. 
Table 1.2.  Coverage and costs by insurance enrollee, 2014  
 
Subsidized 
Poor/Near Poor 
(Informal) 
Formal Sector 
Contributory 
Nonpoor Informal 
Sector 
Total Eligible Population  54,882,606 103,123,785 
Total Enrollees (and % of 
eligible population) 
95,015,106 
23,456,697 
(43%) 
13,882,595 
(13%) 
Average “Premium” (Rp or 
US$ / Capita / Month) 
Rp 18,668 or US$ 
1.4 (paid by 
government) 
Rp 62,349 or US$ 
4.5 
Rp 11,318 or US$ 
0.82 
Average cost paid out by 
SHI 
(Rupiah/Capita/Month) 
RP 8,813 or US$ 
0.64 
Rp 72,629 or US$ 
5.2 
Rp 73,036 or US$ 
5.3 
Source: Dartanto et al. 2016 using 2014 BPJS data 
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The health care benefits under the BPJS are comprehensive.  They include infectious 
diseases, open-heart surgery, dialysis, and cancer therapies provided by health care 
providers contracted with the BPJS Kesahatan (Hidayat 2015).  They also have a 
negative list of services not covered under the health insurance that exempt services 
such as alternative medicine, cosmetic surgery, and services to conceive a child (The 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2015).   Initially, the benefits package did not have cost-
sharing requirements such as co-pays, deductibles or ceilings.  The current version of 
the benefits package, revised in 2017 now includes ceilings on eye-glasses, hearing 
aids, and medical handicap devices (Mahendradhata et al. 2017).  The network of 
contracted providers includes all public providers and select empaneled private 
providers.  Primary care provision is available through public sector primary care clinics, 
called puskesmas or general practitioners (GP), who can be in the public or private 
sector.  SHI enrollees are required to register with a puskesmas or GPs, who also serve 
as gatekeepers for referrals to specialist or secondary/tertiary level care 
(Mahendradhata et al 2017).   Overall, the supply of health care infrastructure and 
human resources is constrained, especially in rural areas.   There is wide geographic 
variation in supply and on average, measures of health care supply fall below most 
international standards.  For example, there are fewer than 1.8 health workers per 1,000 
population, well below international recommendations of 2.5 health workers per 1,000 
population (Mahendradhata et al 2017).  JKN’s provider payment mechanism includes a 
mix of capitation for primary care and an Indonesian case-mix based grouping or DRG 
system for public and private hospitals.   Uninsured patients, paying out of pocket for 
health care, typically pay for services on a fee-for-service basis in both primary care and 
hospital settings. 
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Figures on the composition of Indonesia’s total health expenditure (THE) provide a 
perspective on how SHI fits into Indonesia’s overall health system.  The SHI system 
accounts for about 14 percent of Indonesia’s total health expenditures in 2015 (WHO 
2018).  Central and local governments separately finance supply-side inputs such as 
capital investments, salaries and commodities through a complex decentralized system.    
By comparison, public expenditures accounted for 38 percent of THE.  Public health 
spending accounts for a small share of GDP (1%) and total government expenditures 
(7%).   Despite this complex mix of social and general revenue financing, out of pocket 
spending still constitutes the bulk (48%) of total health spending.  Private voluntary 
health insurance is limited, accounting for 2 percent of THE (WHO 2018). 
1.3 The demand for health insurance among the informal sector in 
developing countries 
 
Indonesia’s social health insurance reform adopts what Fuchs (2009) describes as the 
“necessary and sufficient” conditions for universal coverage, subsidization and 
compulsion.   These two policy features overcome the market failures described in 
conventional theories of health insurance.  Despite integrating compulsion and 
subsidization into its health reform, Indonesia is unable to effectively enforce compulsory 
enrollment.  As a result, its system may be more comparable to a voluntary health 
insurance system with incomplete subsidies, resulting in adverse selection among the 
nonpoor informal sector.   
Conventional theories of demand for health insurance consider risk utility and the 
welfare effects of moral hazard.   The demand for health insurance is typically a function 
of health status, wealth, risk preferences, and features of the individual contract (Arrow 
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1963).  But critiques of conventional theories of health insurance question how the 
underlying assumptions apply within the context of the informal sector in developing 
countries (Dror et al. 2014).  The limited empirical literature on the demand for voluntary 
health insurance among the informal sector suggests that enrollment decisions are 
influenced by social considerations that may fall outside of conventional theory.  This 
section briefly describes the theory of demand for health insurance and its relevance to 
understanding insurance uptake among the informal sector in developing countries.  It 
also describes some of the empirical literature regarding other factors that influence 
insurance enrollment in developing countries. 
The theory of demand for health insurance builds on the Von Neumann-Morgenstern risk 
utility function in which an individual is faced with the possibility of experiencing one of 
two wealth states.  He faces the probability, 𝜋 of experiencing a shock resulting in a loss 
condition, Wl or the probability, 1- 𝜋 of remaining in the no-loss condition, Wn.  Expected 
utility theory predicts that a risk averse individual would be willing to pay a premium, P, 
which is a function of 𝜋 and I, the reimbursement for insurance.   That is, she would be 
willing to reduce her wealth, relative to the no-loss condition, Wn to be protected from 
experiencing the loss condition (Zweifel 2013).   
Another feature of health insurance demand is that excess health care consumption can 
result from moral hazard (Pauly 1968).  That is, consumers without health insurance 
consume health care to the point where the marginal benefit equals marginal cost.  With 
health insurance, consumers face a zero-marginal cost of health care.  As a result, the 
insured tends to consume a level of health care above what he would have consumed 
without insurance, resulting in a welfare loss.    Nyman (2003) extends this notion to 
describe the welfare-enhancing effects of moral hazard for the sick insured.  That is, 
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illness imposes a cost or negative income effect on the sick and limits the ability to 
consume health care optimally.  Insurance allows the sick to consume more health care 
above an inefficient pre-insurance level.  This extension may be relevant within the 
developing country context, where demand for health care is characterized by under-
utilization.    
Adverse selection could also drive initial uptake of health insurance in the nonpoor 
informal sector.  A cluster randomized control trial in Vietnam that provided cash 
incentives and insurance information to increase enrollment found little change in 
insurance enrollment except among sicker patients (Wagstaff et al. 2016).     Observed 
higher health care utilization rates among the insured compared to the uninsured could 
be indicative of either adverse selection or moral hazard.  Based on data from the 2014-
15 Indonesia Family Life Survey (see table 1.3), the contributory nonpoor informal 
sector insurance enrollees have higher rates of diagnosed chronic illness as well as 
inpatient and outpatient utilization compared to informal sector members without 
insurance, the poor enrollees, and the formal sector.   This could indicate adverse 
selection, where sicker individuals self-select into insurance enrollment.  It could also 
indicate moral hazard in which individuals use health care services with greater 
frequency; greater use of health services could result in more opportunity to receive a 
chronic illness diagnosis.   
The contributory nonpoor informal sector are more likely to exhibit adverse selection 
characteristics relative to both the fully subsidized poor and the formal sector. This is 
because the fully subsidized poor/near poor are pre-identified through a centralized 
proxy-means testing process, so selection issues among this category would be 
minimized.  The formal sector, comprises of workers (or their dependents) in the 
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government or private sector.  These sectors are subject to greater regulatory 
enforcement.   Table 1.2 shows that contributory nonpoor informal sector enrollees have 
a higher ratio of claims to premiums (645 percent) relative to the average enrollee’s 
claims ratio (105 percent) (Dartanto et al. 2016).   This indicates that the enrolled 
nonpoor informal sector enrollees derive significant value from having social health 
insurance relative to the premiums they pay.  While we do not have data on the costs of 
health care incurred by the unenrolled nonpoor informal sector, we do have data on the 
average value of health care experienced by the fully subsidized poor/near poor 
beneficiaries.   The average payment made by SHI for the fully subsidized poor/near 
poor beneficiary is Rp 8,813/capita/month (US$ 0.6), which falls below the premiums set 
for the nonpoor informal sector.   The theory of adverse selection suggests that nonpoor 
informal sector who opt out of SHI are healthier and recognize that their premiums 
exceed the value of having insurance.   
The higher level of health care utilization observed among the insured may be 
suggestive of moral hazard.  Yet, this may not differentially effect demand for insurance 
among the nonpoor informal sector.  Moral hazard characteristics would be expected to 
manifest across all insurance eligibility categories.  That is, insurance would potentially 
increase health care utilization for all who have health insurance relative to their 
counterfactual level of use. 
Both contributory nonpoor informal sector and formal sector enrollees in SHI have higher 
rates of chronic illness compared to their counterparts without SHI (see table 1.3).  
Having SHI could also increase the likelihood of using health services that allow 
individuals to receive a chronic illness diagnosis.  The poor/near poor who are fully 
subsidized also have slightly higher rates of chronic illness.  The poor/near poor tend to 
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be a sicker   population, but they also now use health care services at a higher rate 
relative to the uninsured. 
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Table 1.3. Health and utilization rate by insurance across the informal sector 
  SHI – Contributory  SHI - Poor/Near Poor  No SHI 
Variable N Mean SD  N Mean SD  N Mean SD 
% who used outpatient care in last four weeks  569 24% 43%  1,944 18% 38%  4,353 17% 37% 
% who used inpatient care in last 12 months 569 9% 29%  1,944 4% 19%  4,353 2% 15% 
% diagnosed with at least one chronic illness 569 42% 49%  1,944 32% 47%  4,350 29% 45% 
Note:  The SHI-contributory group have statistically significant different health utilization characteristics.   
Data are for Indonesians, 14 years old and above. 
Source: Author calculations from IFLS V data 
 
 
Informal sector characteristics and health insurance demand 
In developing countries, many people pay out of pocket for health care and do not use pre-paid risk pooled mechanisms.   Markets 
for voluntary health insurance in developing countries are limited; even if available, there is typically limited uptake of such insurance, 
suggesting low demand for these types of products.  For example, a randomized trial in India that bundled health insurance with 
microfinance to households found that a large share of microfinance clients (16%) was willing to give up microfinance to avoid 
purchasing health insurance (Banerjee et al. 2014).   This suggests that some specific features of the informal sector in developing 
countries need to be considered in relation to conventional theories of demand: 
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1) Community level decision-making.  Based on observations of microinsurance 
in India, Dror et al. (2014) find that an essential feature of demand is the 
collective nature of decision-making.  That is, decisions regarding the uptake and 
features (e.g. benefits package composition) of microinsurance depend on 
whether communities can achieve group consensus.  This view emphasizes the 
role of community interests overriding individual considerations of risk-utility.  
This is evident in the context of small risk pools organized at the community 
level, as with community-based health insurance programs.  But it also suggests 
that community engagement potentially influences household level decision-
making in the uptake of SHI.    
2) Informal social safety nets.  A simple model of insurance demand assumes 
that there is a binary choice between having formal insurance versus not having 
insurance (Dror et al. 2014).  The availability of informal social safety nets offers 
a third option.  Specifically, households in the informal sector rely on a network of 
family members, friends, or others in their community, when faced with income 
shocks.  Reliance on an informal social safety net may crowd out demand for 
formal insurance mechanisms, as was evident in the response to the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  The largest impact was in Indonesia, resulting in a drop of 13 
percent of GDP between 1997 and 1998 (Rieffel 2007).  Yet the crisis had no 
significant impact on health outcomes because of household coping mechanisms 
which included reliance on extended family networks (Waters et al. 2003).    
3) Lack of awareness and understanding of the value of health insurance.  
The assumption that individuals fully understand the value of health insurance 
may not hold among informal sector populations, particularly among less 
educated rural households who have never been exposed to formal health 
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insurance mechanisms.   Aside from lack of awareness of the availability of 
insurance, insurance competencies may be limited in a population that has not 
previously been exposed to formal risk protection mechanisms.  Health insurance 
may also have the properties of a credence good, where characteristics are 
revealed only after a transaction is completed (Dror et al. 2014).  
More fundamental is the lack of awareness of insurance.  An April 2014 survey in 
Indonesia of reasons why the nonpoor informal sector was not enrolling showed 
that 39 percent did not know about the health insurance, 19 percent did not know 
how to register, 20 percent did not have enough money, 6 percent said that the 
cost was larger than the benefit, 2 percent would self-insure, and 14 percent was 
“other” (Dartanto et al. 2016).   
4) Limited trust in public institutions.  A critical assumption is that many 
individuals trust that they will receive the legally mandated benefits of health 
insurance.  Yet those in the informal sector may have fewer interactions with and 
less trust in public sector institutions.  CBHI programs in developing countries are 
also typically donor-driven programs with limited uptake.  Because of a lack of 
financial sustainability, the issue of trust in the viability of CBHI is credible.  Trust 
in Indonesia’s social health insurance system could be different because of the 
larger role of the state in the provision of a breadth of various social protection 
mechanisms within and outside of the health sector.   Nevertheless, widespread 
perception of corruption may contribute to a mistrust in the institution. 
5) Preference for informal or private providers.  Low demand for health 
insurance may reflect low demand for public health care services.  Informal 
sector workers may prefer to access services outside the formal or public sector, 
including informal or private practice physicians.  These preferences may be due 
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to characteristics specific to the public sector such as longer wait lines, 
availability only during inconvenient working hours, stock outs of essential drugs, 
or greater responsiveness to patient  needs in the private sector (Zwi et al. 2001). 
Private or traditional providers are typically not covered by social health 
insurance programs.    Dual practice in which public providers can moonlight as 
private providers is allowable in Indonesia, which can result in self-referral of 
public providers to off-hours private practice.  Moreover, traditional or informal 
providers are not recognized by the Ministry of Health which aims to modernize 
its health system.  Further, public provision of services may not be viewed as 
providing high quality services.  Health care supply is constrained by low supply 
of a skilled health workforce, availability of medicines, and poor infrastructure 
(Bonfert et al.  2015).   
6) Supply side constraints.  The demand for health insurance may be lower in 
areas where there are health care supply shortages.  For example, people living 
in rural areas may have fewer available health care providers.   In these areas, 
health insurers would not have a broad network of providers, health care 
utilization is probably low and would remain low even with health insurance 
coverage, and the value of having health insurance would be low.      
A recent systematic review of the factors influencing the uptake of community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) programs across developing countries provides relevant 
insights for enrollment among Indonesia’s informal sector (Adebayo et al. 2015).  
Consistent with the features of informal sector demand, 15 characteristics describing 
socio-demographics (age, sex, location, education, income, household size, marital 
status), membership in an existing community association, health-related issues and 
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other factors (trust) were identified as having an impact on enrollment.    Health-related 
issues refers to issues such as quality of health care, household illness, use of 
conventional medicine, proximity to facilities, and health status.  Proximity to facilities is 
an indicator of supply constraints that can negative impact demand for health insurance.  
Health status can provide an indicator of adverse selection issues. These characteristics 
are consistent with the suggested reasons for low demand for health insurance in 
developing countries.     
1.4 Methodology   
This analysis uses the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitudinal data set 
with five panels:   1993/4, 1997/8, 2000, 2007/8 and 2014/2015.  It is representative of 
roughly 83 percent of the population in 1993 with data on individuals from over 10,000 
households in 13 of the 26 provinces in the country.  Subsequent panels interviewed the 
same or split-off households.  Application of cross-sectional person and household 
weights for each panel allows the waves to be nationally representative for each time- 
period.  The IFLS collects data on type of health insurance enrollment, health benefits 
and utilization, physical health and cognitive assessments, subjective well-being 
assessments, personality module, and community level public and private provider data.     
This analysis uses the recent panel to employ cross-sectional analyses.  We restrict the 
analysis to households surveyed between January and October 2015.  The application 
of cross-section survey weights helps to generalize the use of data restricted to this 
timeframe. 
Methods.   A probit model is deployed to test the impact of socio-demographic, health-
related, and community preferences on enrollment in the SHI among the nonpoor 
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informal sector population.  Given data limitations, we cannot identify sufficient proxy 
indicators to test for risk-aversion, access to informal social safety nets, and trust in 
government institutions.  We also cannot examine insurance plan features.  Premium 
levels that vary by the three tiers of hospital class for the informal sector have been 
imposed nationally. The IFLS does not indicate which of the three tiers of social health 
insurance classes were selected and the corresponding premium paid; there is no data 
on the value of health benefits received by social health insurance enrollees.  The tiering 
for the premium levels potentially represent the government’s efforts to price 
discriminate among the nonpoor informal sector.  So, the household expenditure 
variable potentially proxies for price. Therefore, our main analysis excludes insurance 
plan features, insurance literacy, and premiums.  We focus instead on household 
determinants identified in other literature (see table 1.4). 
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 Table 1.4.  Summary characteristics of the nonpoor informal sector 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
% of population with Social 
Health Insurance 
5,062 12% 32% 0 1 
Age 5,097 41.9 14.0 15 94 
Household size 5,098 4.1 1.8 1 16 
Per Capita household 
expenditure (Rupiah thousands) 
4,793 1,204,952 1,260,390 91,646 20,100,000 
% of household expenditures 
spent on medical care 
4,793 2.5% 6.1% 0.0% 67.7% 
% literate 5,098 88% 33% 0 1 
Highest education level 
completed 
     
      Elementary School 4,820 39% 49% 0 1 
     Some high school 4,820 43% 50% 0 1 
     High school graduate and 
above 
4,820 17% 38% 0 1 
    Other 4,820 0% 2% 0 1 
% of population who are 
smokers 
5,066 45% 50% 0 1 
Self-Assessed health      
     Very healthy 5,066 21% 41% 0 1 
     Somewhat healthy 5,066 56% 50% 0 1 
     Somewhat unhealthy 5,066 22% 41% 0 1 
     Very unhealthy 5,066 1% 12% 0 1 
% male 5,097 55% 50% 0 1 
% married 5,097 80% 40% 0 1 
% rural 5,098 54% 50% 0 1 
Number of private hospitals per 
province 
5,085 164.9 97.2 2 262 
Province      
     North Sumatra 5,098 10% 29% 0 1 
     West Sumatra 5,098 3% 17% 0 1 
     Riau 5,098 1% 10% 0 1 
     Jambi 5,098 0% 5% 0 1 
     South Sumatra 5,098 4% 19% 0 1 
     Lampung 5,098 6% 23% 0 1 
     Bangka Belitung 5,098 1% 10% 0 1 
     Jakarta 5,098 0% 4% 0 1 
     West Java 5,098 3% 16% 0 1 
     Central Java 5,098 16% 36% 0 1 
     Yogyakarta 5,098 14% 35% 0 1 
     East Java 5,098 3% 17% 0 1 
     Banten 5,098 25% 43% 0 1 
     Bali 5,098 3% 18% 0 1 
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     West Nusa Tenggara 5,098 2% 12% 0 1 
     Central Kalimantan 5,098 4% 18% 0 1 
     South Kalimantan 5,098 0% 3% 0 1 
     East Kalimantan 5,098 3% 18% 0 1 
     South Sulawesi 5,098 0% 4% 0 1 
     West Sulawesi 5,098 3% 18% 0 1 
     West Papua 5,098 0% 1% 0 1 
     Other 5,098 0% 2% 0 1 
% of population that self-treated 
in the past 4 weeks 
4,654 73% 44% 0 1 
% of population that self-treated 
in the past 4 weeks with 
traditional medicine 
4,654 19% 40% 0 1 
Provider-assessed health, 
compared to others (1: worst to 
9:best scale) 
4,823 7 1 1 9 
% reporting at least one chronic 
illness 
5,063 31% 46% 0 1 
Time to nearest public health 
facility (hours) 
4,843 0.3 1.0 0 30 
% living less than an hour from a 
public health facility 
5,098 93% 26% 0 1 
% of households who live closer 
to a private facility 
5,098 29% 45% 0 1 
% of population involved in the following community activities in last 
12 months 
  
    Women's association activities    4,652 7% 25% 0 1 
    Community Weighing Post    4,652 7% 26% 0 1 
    Community Weighing Post for 
the elderly    
4,652 3% 17% 0 1 
Source: IFLS V and Ministry of Health (2016) 
 
The demand for social health insurance among the nonpoor informal sector is 
constructed as below using a probit model: 
𝑃(𝑄𝑖 = 1|𝑋) =  ɸ(𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑜
− 𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝛽4𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽6𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝜀) 
where 𝑄𝑖 is a dummy variable representing the individual’s probability of enrolling (or 
not) in the SHI.  The data are restricted to individuals in the informal sector and not 
enrolled in private insurance or SHI as a fully subsidized member. For the purposes of 
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this analysis, which is focused on enrollment by the informal sector in the partially 
subsidized health insurance, the poor/near poor are defined as those who are enrolled 
as the PBI (Peneriman Bantuan Iuran) or non-contributory group, who have been pre-
identified via a proxy means test to receive fully subsidized insurance.  The statistical 
definition of the informal sector is based on survey categories that include the self-
employed, unpaid family workers, and casual workers in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors.   This statistical definition has been previously used in an analysis of informal 
sector employment using the IFLS data (Hohberg et al 2015).  Note that this may not 
consistent with the national statistical definition of the informal sector because the 
government’s statistical agency does not use the IFLS data as their basis for collecting 
employment data.  The government’s statistical agency uses the Sakernas data set, 
used in chapter 2 to capture national labor statistics.  Informal sector dependents who 
reported receiving health insurance through PT Askes or Jamkesmas were removed 
from the sample. 
The right-hand side variables serve as controls measuring factors identified in 
conventional and alternative theories of demand.   Proxies for health status include age, 
chronic illness, smoking status, self-assessed health status, and provider-assessed 
health status.  The chronic illness indicator is based on respondents who reported that a 
health care provider diagnosed the respondent with at least one chronic health condition.  
The survey provided a list of chronic conditions common in Indonesia such as 
hypertension, diabetes, and tuberculosis. The provider-assessed health status is based 
on a nine-point scale determined by nurses who administered the health measurements 
module of the IFLS.   The survey also asked respondents to rate their own health 
conditions as very healthy, somewhat healthy, somewhat unhealthy, or very unhealthy.     
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Self-assessed health indicators are considered valid indicators for comparing health 
conditions across population groups (Idler et al. 1997).   
The explanatory variables include whether the patient undertook any self-treatment 
including self-treatment through use of traditional medicine or over the counter use of 
modern medicines.  In the developing Asia country context, unlicensed private 
pharmacies and retail drug stores are typically a patient’s first access point into the 
health system when sick (Miller et al 2016).  The insurance provider networks and 
benefits package exclude private pharmacies, drug retailers, and traditional medicines; 
reliance on this form of self-treatment would be indicative of low demand for the benefits 
provided under the SHI system.   
Facility proximity variables capture proximity to a public health facility as well as to a 
public versus a private facility.  All public facilities are part of the health insurance 
network but only a select number of private hospitals and GPs are empaneled.   A 
preference for private providers not covered under the health insurance would reduce 
demand for the SHI.   Using data from the 2016 Ministry of Health survey of private 
hospitals, we include a variable on the number of private hospitals by region to proxy for 
supply constraints, representing the desirability of health workers to work in a region.  
Although the data comes from after the implementation of the reform, it provides a 
potentially exogenous proxy given the potential lag time in facility construction.  Another 
indicator captured in previous studies of insurance uptake is the role of insurance 
literacy and awareness, which is not directly measured in the survey.  The closest 
proxies we have are education and literacy.     
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The IFLS survey does not include effective proxies for risk-utility, trust in institutions, and 
access to informal social protection mechanisms.  The survey does include a module on 
trust including questions about trust of other village members rather than government or 
institutions.  
An exploratory process of testing the significance of individual and household 
characteristics is used.  Final selection of the model is based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).  The AIC criterion can be used 
to compare multiple models and identify the information lost from using one model over 
another.  The AIC is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 2𝑘 − 2ln (?̂?) 
The AIC criterion is typically preferred over the BIC criterion for regressions. The BIC 
criterion is typically used for the identification of a “true model” used to generate the 
data.  The BIC criterion is calculated as follows: 
𝐵𝐼𝐶 = ln(𝑛) 𝑘 − 2ln (?̂?) 
where 𝑘 is the number of model parameters, ?̂? is the maximum value of the likelihood 
function, and 𝑛 is the number of data points.  The models that generates the lowest AIC 
and BIC are shown.   
1.5 Results 
Table 1.5 shows the marginal effects of select probit models with (1) lowest AIC, (2) the 
lowest BIC, and (3) a parsimonious selection of covariates.    The statistical significance 
of the model parameters is robust to the composition of different explanatory variables.  
The weak pseudo R-squared across models demonstrates the limitations of the 
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goodness of fit to the survey data in predicting the probability of enrollment into the SHI 
among the nonpoor informal sector.   
Table 1.5.  Marginal effects at means of the non-price determinants of health 
insurance demand  
  (1) (2) (3) 
  SHI SHI SHI 
    
Age 0.00111 0.00299  
 (0.00229) (0.00215)  
    
Age squared -1.59E-06 -1.99E-05  
 2.67E05 2.55E05  
    
Household size 0.00276 0.00290  
 (0.00313) (0.00317)  
    
Log per capita household expenditure 0.0222** 0.0238** 0.0209** 
 (0.00823) (0.00834) (0.00706) 
    
Log of household's share of expenditures 
spent on medical care 0.00277 0.00318  
 (0.00319) (0.00332)  
    
Literate 0.0502 0.0742* 0.0707* 
 (0.0349) (0.0363) (0.0343) 
Highest education level completed 
(reference group is some elementary 
school or less)    
      Some high school 0.0397*** 0.0487*** 0.0363*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0105) 
    
     High school graduate and above 0.0879*** 0.0927*** 0.0799*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0158) 
    
Smoker -0.0233 -0.0219*  
 (0.0142) (0.0106) 
 
Self-assessed health (reference group is 
very healthy)    
     Healthy 0.00290 0.00429  
 (0.0135) (0.0138)  
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     Unhealthy -0.00947 -0.00613  
 (0.0159) (0.0163)  
    
     Very unhealthy 0.0658 0.0828  
 (0.0589) (0.0628)  
    
Male 0.00594   
 (0.0150)   
    
Married 0.0309*  0.0327** 
 (0.0148)  (0.0127) 
    
Rural -0.0444*** -0.0587*** -0.0636*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0103) 
    
Private hospital  8.38E-05 8.03E-05 
  5.50E+05 5.51E+05 
    
Self-treatment in the last 4 weeks 
-0.0164   
 (0.0116)   
    
Self-treatment with traditional medicine in 
the last 4 weeks -0.0240  -0.0308* 
 (0.0137)  (0.0129) 
    
Provider-assessed health, compared to 
others 
-0.00590 -0.00124 
 
(1: worst to 9: best scale) (0.00482) (0.00473)  
    
Chronic 0.0345** 0.0366** 0.0476*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0123) (0.0114) 
    
Time to public health facility (hours) 0.00923 0.0103  
 (0.00584) (0.00633)  
    
Less than an hour to a public health facility 0.121 0.123  
 (0.0805) (0.0852)  
    
Closer to a private health facility 0.00979  0.0267** 
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 (0.0105)  (0.0101) 
 
   
     Women's association activities 0.0535* 0.0472* 0.0714** 
 (0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0236) 
    
     Community weighing post 0.0134   
 (0.0205)   
    
     Community weighing post for the 
elderly 0.0362 0.0304  
 (0.0351) (0.0348)  
    
N 3734 3749 4162 
pseudo R-sq 0.110 0.068 0.066 
AIC 2573 2645.9 2867.7 
BIC 2847 2776.7 2943.7 
    
Standard errors in parentheses    
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001    
 
The resultant statistically significant explanatory variables are mostly consistent with 
previous analyses of the non-price determinants of social health insurance enrollment in 
developing countries.  Variables such as expenditures, education, health (chronic illness 
and smoking), living in a rural area, and community involvement (participation in a 
women’s group) were associated with enrollment in the social health insurance system.    
Indicators that lack explanatory power include demographic characteristics such as sex, 
marital status, and province (not shown).   Other variables that lack statistically 
significant explanatory power are like other significant indicators for socio-economic, 
health-related, facility-distance, and some community indicators.  This includes the 
following: percent household expenditures spent on medical care which are both a 
function of per capita expenditures; indicators of health care supply (facility proximity 
measured by distance to a public facility, relative distance to a public facility compared to 
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a private facility, and regional availability of private hospitals); the self-treatment variable 
is based on whether someone chose to self-treat in the last four weeks either through 
over the counter drugs, traditional medicine, or other care.  Self-treatment is negatively 
correlated with education attainment. Participation in a community weighing post for 
babies is also significantly correlated with the other two community variables used in the 
model.   
Based on model 2, household consumption, education (educational attainment and 
literacy), chronic illness, living in a rural area and participation in a women’s group 
increased the probability of being enrolled in the social health insurance system.     
Education (literacy and educational attainment) and living in a rural area had the largest 
size effects.  Being literate and increasing education level from some elementary school 
to at least a high school graduate increased the probability of insurance enrollment for 
the average individual by seven and nine percentage points, respectively.  The 
probability of enrollment in SHI for an average illiterate and uneducated (some 
elementary school) nonpoor informal sector individual is just three percent.  The 
education variables are indicative of awareness and understanding of both the 
availability and value of insurance.   
The indicators for community engagement, women’s associations, and access to 
weighing stations may not fully capture the type of community decision-making 
processes and cohesion described in the characteristics of community-based health 
insurance.  Engagement in a women’s association increased the probability by five 
percentage points.   The probability of SHI enrollment for the average nonpoor informal 
sector person who does not participate in these activities is ten percent. 
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Living in a rural area had a slight dampening effect on enrollment with a probability 
reduction of five percentage points.  The probability of SHI enrollment for the average 
Indonesian living in in a rural area is eight percent.  There is less access to quality 
publicly provided health care in rural areas and so the value and awareness of health 
insurance would be diminished for the 48 percent of the population who are rural 
residents relative to an urban resident.   
The set of variables selected to proxy for the demographic, socio-economic, health-
related and community indicators may be similar enough to result in multicollinearity.  
Multicollinearity problems would result in an inaccurate estimation of the regression 
coefficients.  A test for multicollinearity is based on tolerance, a function of the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), measured by 1/(1-R2).   The R-squared for an OLS approximation 
of model two is used to estimate the VIF.  Tolerance is measured by 1/VIF; a tolerance 
below 0.1 indicates multicollinearity.  This test indicates limited multicollinearity among 
the covariates in model 2 (see table 1.6).  Only the province indicator, which was not 
found to be statistically significant fell below this threshold.    Without the province 
indicator, tolerance tests do not indicate multicollinearity of remaining covariates.  
Stability of the coefficients across models 1 to 3 demonstrate limited change in effect 
size from the presence of province on the estimation of the covariates. 
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Table 1.6.  Variance inflation factor and collinearity 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Age 1.35 0.74 
Household size 1.19 0.84 
Log per capita household expenditure 1.30 0.77 
Log of household's share of expenditures spent on medical 
care 
1.04 0.96 
Literate 1.11 0.90 
Highest education level completed (reference group is some 
elementary school or less) 
  
      Some high school 1.62 0.62 
     High school graduate and above 1.56 0.64 
Smoker 1.07 0.93 
Self-assessed health (reference group is very healthy)   
     Healthy 1.76 0.57 
     Unhealthy 1.81 0.55 
     Very unhealthy 1.06 0.94 
Rural 1.18 0.85 
Private hospitals 1.11 0.90 
Provider-assessed health, compared to others 1.04 0.96 
Chronic 1.11 0.90 
Time to public health facility (hours) 1.32 0.76 
Less than an hour to a public health facility 1.32 0.76 
Participation in community activities 1.10 0.91 
     Women's association activities 1.07 0.93 
     Community weighing post for the elderly 1.07 0.93 
Note:  VIF = Variance inflation factor 
 
1.6 Discussion 
This chapter identifies non-price factors such as education, illness, and proxies for 
facility proximity that affect enrollment in social health insurance among the nonpoor 
informal sector in Indonesia.  It corroborates findings from the limited literature on the 
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demand for social health insurance in developing countries.  It provides insight into some 
of the non-price determinants of demand including the selection of a potential instrument 
that can be used in chapter Three to identify the impact of the reform on health 
utilization, financial protection, and health outcomes.  This is important because in the 
absence of full subsidization, policies aimed to expand informal sector enrollment should 
consider factors other than price.   
Experiences in other developing countries have found that extending UHC is most 
challenging for countries with large informal sector populations (Cotlear et al. 2015; 
Bonfert et al. 2015; Acharya et al. 2011).  Policy questions tend to examine issues such 
as whether coverage to health services by the informal sector should be subsidized 
through general revenue financing or through a contributory mechanism.  The World 
Bank’s review of case studies found that Thailand and China were able to accelerate 
coverage of their informal sector through general revenue financing to subsidize informal 
sector populations (Cotlear et al. 2015).  For example, Thailand’s Universal Coverage 
Scheme made significant progress toward UHC with general revenue financing providing 
subsidies for their poor and informal sector populations.  Indonesia’s constrained fiscal 
space for health may limit the ability to provide sufficient subsidies to fully cover its large 
informal sector.    At the current levels of government health spending, specifically with 
the current revenue collection and resource allocation and purchasing modes for the 
social health insurance system, the social health insurance systems runs a deficit.   The 
government’s overall revenue collection from taxes and other revenue sources is still 
insufficient to cover its overall government spending priorities.   
Countries such as Indonesia that rely on contributory mechanisms for their large informal 
sector populations tend to achieve partial population coverage.  Other issues include 
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finding ways to identify and enroll the informal sector through identification strategies, 
enforcing mandates, changing units of enrollment, and deploying contribution collection 
methods (Bonfert et al. 2015).    
One study conducted a triple bounded dichotomies contingent valuation study of the 
willingness to pay for insurance among Indonesia’s informal sector (Dartanto et al. 
2016).   That study surveyed 400 households in the informal sector on their willingness 
to pay for the three different classes of health insurance benefits package and found that 
70 percent of the surveyed respondents were willing to pay a premium that is lower than 
the current levels of premium.  The net insurance benefit and the relatively high 
willingness to pay suggest that the premium level for insurance should be sufficiently low 
enough to attract greater enrollment, further necessitating an investigation into non-price 
factors that influence enrollment.  
The present study has identified several factors that influence insurance uptake.  A 
policymaker focused on expanding enrollment and enhancing equity should consider the 
relatively strong influence of education and proximity to health services.  Participation in 
women’s association activities also increased enrollment in insurance.  These 
association activities, discussed further in chapter Three, have been leveraged as a 
means of propagating information for the social health insurance system and indicates 
the importance of knowledge dissemination.  We suggest that concurrent investments 
could make the value of insurance more widely understood by the less educated and 
increase the supply of health services to remote populations.    This is consistent with 
other studies that have found limited health insurance literacy and awareness and 
limited coverage of relevant health services as factors that influence uptake.    
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The focus of this chapter has been on the coverage aspects of UHC, yet the reform also 
impacts other critical dimensions of UHC and economic development.  The subsequent 
chapters examine how expansion of UHC to the informal sector influences informal 
employment, health, utilization, and financial protection.   
36 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Informalization and health sector reform 
 
2.1 Overview: Research question and significance 
Achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) has an estimated minimum price tag of $86 
per capita per year or 5 percent of GDP (Chatham House 2014).  To pay for it will 
require more and different ways of mobilizing resources.  The World Health 
Organization’s 2010 World Health Report on Health systems financing: the path to 
Universal Health Coverage called for an increase in the efficiency of revenue collection, 
a reprioritization of government budgets, innovative financing such as tobacco or airline 
taxes for the health sector, and increasing development assistance for health (WHO 
2010).    These recommendations were made with a focus on financing health systems 
but should be assessed by their impact on broader economic and development goals.  
This chapter examines how Indonesia’s use of payroll taxes to finance part of its UHC 
scheme impacts its economy, specifically the mix of formal and informal sector jobs. 
Within the context of domestic resources for the health sector, the WHO has 
emphasized increasing pre-paid risk pooled financing mechanisms through general 
revenue (or tax) financing, or social health insurance contributions as a means of 
achieving UHC3 (WHO 2010).  Tax revenues as a share of GDP tend to be limited in 
low- and middle- income countries, and social health insurance systems that rely only on 
payroll tax contributions are constrained by the size of their formal sectors.  Many 
developing countries, including Indonesia, rely on a mix of different pooled financing 
sources including payroll taxes and premiums that contribute to a social health insurance 
                                                          
3 The WHO does not see private insurance as a primary means of achieving UHC 
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system combined with general revenues to finance a publicly provided service delivery 
system and/ or provide subsidies to the poor and informal sector.   Private financing, 
mainly through out of pocket expenditures, still constitutes the main source of health 
expenditures.   
Each source of health financing has implications for expanding UHC, achieving equity 
(i.e. the regressive/progressive nature of resource mobilization), and economic growth.   
Most global health practitioners are focused on the first two benefits of UHC and see 
these investments in health as beneficial for improving economic productivity and 
growth.  But the expansion of UHC potentially creates a disincentive for workers to 
participate in the formal sector.  Instead, workers can opt for the informal sector because 
a UHC expansion allows them to access health benefits without making payroll tax 
payments.   As a result, a reduced formal sector can potentially lead to reduced long 
term economic growth (Loayza 2011).   This chapter seeks to provide insight into the 
impact of UHC on labor markets by looking at how the change in the payroll tax and 
expansion of coverage under Indonesia’s health insurance reform affects the labor 
market.    Specifically, this chapter asks did Indonesia’s 2014 Social Health Insurance 
reform increase informal sector employment.  Unlike the previous chapter, this chapter 
uses labor force participation data to analyze the working formal and informal sector 
population.  Because of the data used, the term informal sector refers specifically to 
those who work in the informal sector, irrespective of insurance or income status.  A 
statistical definition provided in the methodology section goes into greater detail about 
the employment categories used to classify the informal sector. 
Indonesia’s 2014 Social Health Insurance reform increased payroll tax contributions for 
unmarried formal sector employees and allowed the informal sector to access the same 
health benefits package as the formal sector through a relatively less expensive 
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contributory level.  Before the reform, health insurance was compulsory for formal sector 
employees through a payroll tax that was based on marital status.  The reform created 
one payroll tax level, irrespective of marital status.  The tax on regular salaries/wages 
increased for unmarried formal sector workers, but it fell for married workers.  
Specifically, the tax for unmarried workers increased from three to five percent and fell 
from six to five percent for married workers.    This differential change in the payroll tax 
for married and unmarried formal sector workers creates a natural cutoff for identifying 
the impact of the payroll tax on informal sector employment.  We show that a propensity 
score matching with difference in difference analysis on Sakernas, Indonesia’s Labor 
Force Participation survey, results in an increase in informal employment among 
unmarried males of 1.6 percentage points relative to the counterfactual trend toward 
formalization.   
2.2 Background:  Informal employment and social health insurance 
The Government of Indonesia’s medium-term development objectives articulated goals 
to increase access to health care and employment protected by social security programs 
(Allen 2016).  Indonesia’s 2014 health insurance reform was implemented as part of an 
effort to achieve these objectives4.   The country’s large informal sector, comprised of up 
to 70 percent5 of the workforce, translates into a sizeable population with limited access 
to formal social protection mechanisms.   The health insurance reform sought to 
increase access to health care and financial protection from health shocks.   It unified 
the fragmented risk pools for civil servants, military, the private formal sector, and the 
poor under one social health insurance system, Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (JKN), 
and one social security agency, Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS).  It also 
                                                          
4 Details of the reform are described in greater detail in chapter I. 
5 Estimates vary by dataset and period. The Sakernas 2013 data in this analysis estimates that informal 
employment is 53 percent. 
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changed insurance access for the informal sector and the payroll tax and enrollment 
requirements for the formal sector. Specifically, it phased in a mandated enrollment for 
the large informal sector who could purchase partially subsidized premiums for a 
benefits package comparable to that available to the formal sector.   Indonesians 
negligent in keeping up with their premiums would incur a penalty when they reactivated 
their coverage and tried to use inpatient care.  The penalty is calculated based on the 
number of months of inactive insurance X treatment cost X 2.5%; this is up to a max of 
12 months or Rp 30 million (2100 US$), whichever is lower (Expat Indo 2018).  Based 
on IFLS data, average inpatient treatment costs for the uninsured is US$ 118 which 
would result in a potential penalty of US$ 35, or less than half of monthly informal sector 
per capita expenditure (US$ 86).  For the formal sector, it created a uniform tax for 
health insurance, irrespective of marital status and removed the opt out clause for the 
private sector in which employers that provided better health insurance could opt out of 
the health benefit requirement (PWC 2013).   Because of the uniform payroll tax, the 
actual tax on regular salaries/wages increased for unmarried formal sector workers, but 
it fell for married workers.  Specifically, the tax for unmarried workers increased from 
three to five percent and fell from six to five percent for married workers.     
Prior to the 2014 reform, the informal sector was only able to purchase commercial 
health insurance or, where available, access district health insurance schemes 
(Jamkesda) depending on the local scheme’s eligibility requirements.   Most district 
health insurance schemes were created to cover the poor/near poor.  Because private 
health insurance is limited (comprising only two percent of total health spending), most 
Indonesians in the informal sector lacked access to any formal health insurance 
mechanisms.  As a result, almost 60 percent of Indonesians had no health insurance 
coverage (Harimurti et al. 2013).  The 2014 reform aimed to enhance insurance 
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coverage by phasing in a mandate for enrollment based on eligibility categories 
organized by employer size or employee status.  As of January 2015, all state-owned, 
large, medium, and small enterprises were required to enroll their employees.  All micro-
enterprises (<5 employees) were required to enroll by January 2016.  By 2019, all 
independent workers and non-workers will be required to enroll.   
The informal sector can now access a comprehensive benefits package comparable to 
that of the formal sector.    The insurance contribution requirements differ for the informal 
and the formal sectors and they are not tied to the risks and costs of health benefits.  
The informal sector pays subsidized premiums, while the formal sector pays a payroll tax 
to purchase access.  An informal sector enrollee can opt to select one of three premium 
levels, based on class of hospital services.  The highest tier premium of $4.10 per 
person per month provides access to the highest classes of hospital services, 
comparable to the package available to the formal sector.    
The reform also changed the payroll tax on the formal sector.  Prior to the reform, 
government and private formal sector employees were required to enroll in one of their 
respective social health insurance schemes.  The level of payroll taxes for health 
insurance was based on marital status.  Unmarried workers paid three percent of their 
incomes, and married workers paid six percent of their incomes, up to an income 
threshold which also varied by marital status.   Furthermore, the mandate was loosely 
enforced.  Private sector employers could opt out of the health insurance requirement if 
they could demonstrate that they were providing a comparable health benefit to their 
employees.   The reform simplified the taxes to a single rate of five percent, with the 
burden shared between employers (four percent) and employees (one percent).  It also 
simplified the income ceiling threshold and changed the mandate.   In effect, it increased 
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the payroll tax level for unmarried workers, decreased them for married workers, and 
removed the opt out clause for employers.    
The expansion of benefits to the informal sector may have diminished the tax/benefit 
linkage which refers to the value employees may have assigned to having exclusive 
access to the health insurance benefit based on their payroll tax contributions.   With 
2016 GDP per capita at US$ 3,369, a formal sector employee’s payroll tax contribution 
could result in an average payment of US$ 170 per person per year for health insurance.   
By contrast, an Indonesian in the informal sector can now purchase a comparable 
package for less than US$ 50 per person per year.  This differential between the costs of 
insurance for formal and informal sector enrollees potentially breaks the tax/health 
benefit linkage experienced by formal sector employees.      
Informal employment in Indonesia 
Indonesia’s high but declining share of informal sector employment is thought to have 
dampening effects on potential economic growth and government revenues.  We 
describe two competing, but not mutually exclusive theories as to the causes of 
Indonesia’s high informal employment:  1) regulatory and tax burdens imposed on formal 
sector firms and employees create incentives to remain in the informal sector. Formal 
sector firms tend to face larger regulatory and tax burdens, and they also face unfair 
competition by non-compliant informal firms.  Under this view, the UHC reform’s 
increased tax burden creates incentives for workers to join or remain in the informal 
sector while maintaining access to health benefits through lower cost premiums. 2) 
Formal sector work is desirable to employees because of the access to protections; but 
those who work in the informal sector have fundamentally different skill sets that may not 
by attractive to formal sector employers.   Informal sector workers are concentrated in 
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the agricultural sector, which has a lower measure of labor productivity relative to other 
formal sector industry (e.g. mining, manufacturing, or services), as measured by the ratio 
of total gross value of the sector to the size of employment (Cuevas et al. 2009). 
Informal sector workers receive less pay and tend to be less educated.    These 
differences between the formal and the informal sector are reflected in the Sakernas 
data (see table 2.1) which shows that the informal sector is more likely to be married, 
earn less in wages, be older, live in rural areas, have less education, and be female. 
Estimates of the size of the informal sector suggest that it covers 70 percent of the 
workforce and 93 percent of firms (Rothenberg 2016).   Yet, statistical measures of 
informal employment rates in Indonesia have been inconsistent because the national 
definition and labor statistics used to calculate informal employment differ from 
internationally accepted definitions.  Based on a statistical definition put forth by the 
World Bank, the informal sector accounts for just over half (52 percent) of the workforce, 
according to the 2015 Sakernas August data.   The level of informal employment as a 
share of the workforce has been decreasing, falling from 55 to 52 percent between 2011 
and 2015 (see figure 1.1).   Between 2011 and 2015, real wages increased 16 percent 
while unemployment declined slightly by 0.4 percentage points.    By comparison, the 
GDP deflator, one measure of inflation rose at a lower rate (19.4 percent) over this 
period (World Bank 2016). 
Increasing formal sector employment is critical to enhancing economic growth, tax 
revenues, and access to social protection (Loayza 2011).  Indonesia’s high rate of 
informality limits the government’s ability to mobilize domestic resources to finance 
priority social services.  It has one of the lowest tax-to-GDP ratios (10.8 percent in 2014) 
compared to regional and income peers, and because of declining oil prices, its general 
revenues as a share of GDP have fallen from 17.2 percent of GDP in 2012 to 14.3 
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percent in 2016 (IMF 2017).  It has had limited tax enforcement capacity.  In 2015, the 
government collected only 53 percent of its tax revenue target from about 10 million 
Indonesians (of an adult population of 185 million Indonesians) who paid their tax 
obligations (Pramudito 2015).     
Figure 2.1.  Employment, informal employment, and wages between 2011 and 2015 
 
Source: Author calculations from Sakernas 2011 to 2016.  
Note: Real wage base year is 2011.  Calculations based on CPI from World Bank, WDI   
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Table 2.1.  Informal versus formal employee characteristics 
 
Formal Informal 
 
Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Unmarried (%) 29% 46% 133,841 22% 41% 182,495 
Average wage (Rp) 1,512,827 2,116,941 133,841 511,202 968,624 182,495 
Age 37 12 133,841 42 14 182,495 
% with high school 
education 
55% 50% 133,841 16% 36% 182,495 
Rural (%) 32% 47% 133,841 69% 46% 182,495 
Male (%) 66% 47% 133,841 59% 49% 182,495 
Head of household 
(%) 
47% 50% 133,841 48% 50% 182,495 
Source:  Author results from Sakernas, 2013  
Given the lack of compliance with tax requirements among the informal sector, the 
formal sector faces a heavier taxation burden.  In exchange, formal sector workers have 
access to exclusive social and employment protection mechanisms.   Indonesia’s payroll 
tax for health insurance exists within a larger set of contributory social security schemes 
called Jamsostek, which covers accident insurance, death, an old-age lump sum 
payment, health insurance and a pension system (see Table 2.2).   Based on the 2016 
social security payment requirements, an employer is required to pay up to 11.7 percent 
and an employee can pay up to four percent of his wages or salary in social security 
contributions.   The Jamsostek scheme is required for companies with more than ten 
employees or a payroll larger than Rp 1 million per month (EY 2013).   
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Table 2.2.  Payroll tax burden by employer and employee, 2013 to 2016 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 
 Employer Employee Employer Employee Employer Employee Employer Employee 
Working 
accident 
protection  
0.24-1.7%  0.24-
1.7% 
 0.24-
1.7% 
 0.24-
1.7% 
 
Death 
Insurance 
0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  0.3%  
Old Age 
Saving 
3.7% 2% 3.7% 2% 3.7% 2% 3.7% 2% 
Health 
Care 
3% 
(unmarried)  
6% 
(married)  
 4% 0.5% 4% 1% 4% 1% 
Pension       2% 1% 
Source: PWC Indonesia Tax Handbooks 2013-2016 
Notes: (1) In 2013, the payroll tax on health care contributions had a contribution ceiling of Rp 
141,750/month (or 14 US$/month at mid-2013 exchange rates) for unmarried individuals and a contribution 
ceiling of Rp 283,500/month (or 28 US$/month) for married individuals.  This translates into a wage/salary 
ceiling of Rp 4,725,000/month (2) The reform simplified the wage and salary ceiling to Rp 4,725,000/month 
(or 41 US$/month at mid-2014 exchange rates) for both married and unmarried individuals.  This would 
create a contribution ceiling of Rp 236,250/month (or 20 US$/month).  (3) Exchange rates based on IMF 
2018. 
Following the implementation of the health insurance reform, the government included 
additional social security benefits in the form of a pension system, which came into effect 
in 2016.  This is in addition to an old age savings program, which pays out a lump sum 
upon retirement or after a change in employment to a position that does not offer 
Jamsostek.  So, while the benefits are better under formal sector employment, formal 
sector employees who decide to exit the informal sector would have to forego benefits, 
but they are not penalized either.  They would also not lose their payments into the lump 
sum payment benefit for exiting the formal sector.   
In addition to the tax requirements of the social security system, employers are also 
subject to minimum wage laws set at the provincial level and rigid employment laws, 
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guided by the 2003 Manpower Law.  The Indonesian minimum wage is high, even in 
comparison to countries in the OECD, at about 65 percent of median wage in 2004 
(Comola et al. 2011).  The minimum wage is potentially one reason for the large 
differential pay between the formal sector and the informal sector; a study of the 2001 
minimum wage hike found an associated increase in the relative share of informal sector 
employment (Comola et al. 2011).  
In 2013, the Manpower Law aimed to improve worker protections by increasing 
regulations for hiring and firing workers (Alatas et al. 2010).  It increased severance pay 
for workers and made it more difficult to fire workers, resulting in firing costs equivalent 
to 4.1 months of wages (Alatas et al. 2010). In total, the formal sector is subject to a 
heavier burden of taxation and entry/exist costs.  But formal sector employees also 
experience better pay and benefits.   The UHC scheme may increase incentives for 
workers to join or remain in the informal sector but other beneficial aspects of working in 
the formal sector may mitigate these incentives.  
2.3 Social health insurance, payroll taxes and informal sector 
employment in developing countries    
 
Achieving UHC for the informal sector in middle income countries faces the dual 
challenges of expanding coverage for the hard to reach informal sector and creating a 
tax system that does not create incentives for informalization.  Most UHC studies focus 
on the former issue, examining policy solutions to subsidize the nonpoor informal sector 
to expand informal sector coverage (Cotlear et al. 2015).   Studies that have 
demonstrated the impact of expanding social health insurance to informal populations 
have been limited.  Most have focused on payroll tax and UHC reforms in Latin America.  
Globally, social health insurance expansions have been found to increase the level of 
informal employment as a share of the workforce, ranging from an impact as low as less 
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than a half a percentage point to as high as 17 percentage points (Wagstaff et al. 2009, 
Aterido et al. 2011).   
A study of Colombia’s Social Health Insurance expansion in the 1990s found an 
increase in informal employment by 4 percentage points (Camacho et al. 2013).  The 
paper analyzed two different data sets.   It employed municipality and year fixed effects 
on Colombia’s repeated cross-sectional household survey data.  It also employed an 
individual fixed effects analysis that exploited variation in individual’s insurance eligibility 
status in two waves of the SISBEN data, which is a questionnaire that collects detailed 
data on poverty that can be constructed to measure insurance eligibility (Camacho et al. 
2013).  Another study on Colombia examined a tax reform that reduced payroll taxes 
from 29.5 percent to 16 percent on workers who earned between one and ten times 
minimum wage, and found that it was associated with a 4.8 percentage point reduction 
in affected municipalities and an overall reduction of 2.1 percentage points in the overall 
informality rate two years later (Fernandez et al. 2016).  The study used a kernel 
matching approach for affected salaried workers with other non-affected workers as a 
control group and a difference in difference approach across the two (pre-reform and 
post-reform) waves of the survey (Fernandez et al. 2016).   In Chile, the privatization of 
the social security system resulted in a decrease in the payroll tax rate by about 25 
percent over six years which resulted in no employment effects, as measured by 
changes in wages and formal sector employment based on a census from 
manufacturing firms (Gruber 1997).  That study did not examine shifts between the 
formal sector and the informal sector.  Joubert (2015) employed a life cycle model of 
labor supply and savings decisions to measure the welfare and fiscal trade-offs from 
Chile’s pension design.  He found that mandatory pension contributions in Chile 
increased informality and lowered tax revenue.  Based on simulations of the life-cycle 
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model that allowed for endogenous intra-household labor force participation, he found 
that an increase in the contribution rate by five percent led to an increase in the informal 
sector by 12.5 percent for men and 9.3 percent for women.  The paper went on to 
examine changes in household welfare resulting in decreased consumption and 
increased lifetime consumption volatility.  He found that the government’s optimal rate of 
taxation (7.5 percent) was lower than the existing level (10 percent). Even though a 
higher rate reduced minimum pension benefit outlays, it also decreased tax revenue due 
to higher informality rates (Joubert 2015).    
Mexico introduced Seguro Popular to expand health insurance to the 50 million 
Mexicans who lacked social security (Levy 2008).  Exploiting the rollout across 
municipalities over time, one study employed difference in difference estimation with 
fixed effects to find that the program increased informality by 0.4 to 0.7 percentage 
points (Aterido et al. 2011). 
Fewer studies were available on the impact of insurance outside Latin America.  
Examining the labor market impact of social health insurance (SHI) in 28 countries in 
central and eastern Europe and central Asia, Wagstaff et al. (2009) found that SHI 
increased gross wages by 20 percent, reduced employment by ten percent, and 
increased self-employment by 17 percent.  Exploiting Thailand’s staggered 
implementation of its 2001 UHC reforms across provinces, Wagstaff et al. (2012) found 
that the reform increased overall employment and informal employment among married 
women by about 11.6 and 12.5 percentage points, respectively, after three years of the 
reform’s implementation.  It increased informal sector employment among single and 
married men by 10.2 and 8.4 percentage points after three years of implementation.  
Overall, the reform resulted in an increase in informal employment by two percentage 
 
 
49 
 
points in the year that UHC was implemented and by ten percentage points three years 
after implementation (Wagstaff et al. 2012).   
2.4 Theoretical Basis and Conceptual Framework 
The textbook model of the impact of a payroll tax on labor market equilibrium results in a 
deadweight loss and a reduction in employment and wage levels.  In the presence of a 
linked benefit such as health insurance, the resultant labor market equilibrium depends 
on whether the cost of the mandate exceeds the employee’s valuation of the mandate 
(Borjas 2016; Gruber 1997).  Indonesia’s pre-reform payroll tax for health created a 
tax/benefits linkage with benefits that were exclusively available to the formal sector 
workforce.  Under the reform, this payroll tax revenue was pooled with other insurance 
revenue sources for an insurance system that offered benefits accessible by the entire 
population. 
 An outright payroll tax, Ƭ, levied on both employees and employers would shift the 
supply and demand curves.  A payroll tax increases the after-tax costs of labor, shifting 
the demand for labor inward.   The effect on the supply curve is ambiguous, depending 
on how employees value the tax/benefits linkage (see figure 2.2).  If employees fully 
value the benefit at the cost of their payroll tax, then there would be no shift in the supply 
curve.   A partial valuation of the benefit would partially mitigate the dis-employment 
effect of the payroll tax.  That is, the cost of the mandated benefit, Ƭw, to the formal 
sector employee could exceed its value to the employee, if anchored by the lower price 
available to an informal sector employee, Pc  such that Ƭw>Pc.   Thus, the resultant labor 
market equilibrium employment levels would fall relative to pre-reform levels with 
Supply1 but not as much as under a payroll tax only situation.   
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Figure 2.2.  Mandate and payroll tax effects on formal sector labor market equilibrium
 
 
Gruber (1997) provided a mathematical formulation that incorporated the valuation of 
employee benefit with demand and supply as follows: 
Demand:  𝐷 = 𝐷(𝑤∗(1 + 𝑡𝑓)) 
Supply: 𝑆 = 𝑆(𝑤∗(1 − 𝑎𝑡𝑒) + 𝑞𝑤𝑡𝑓) 
where 𝑤∗ is the pre-tax wage, 𝑡𝑓 is the payroll tax on firms, 𝑡𝑒 is the payroll tax on 
employees, 𝑎 is the extent to which employees discount their payroll tax payments 
relative to cash payments, and 𝑞 is the extent to which employees value their payroll tax 
payments relative to cash payments. 
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The equilibrium condition as a function of the elasticity of supply, ƞs, and demand, ƞd, 
provides insights into when the costs of the payroll taxes are fully shifted to wages with 
no dis-employment impacts: 
𝑑𝑤
𝑤
𝑑𝑡𝑓
= 
ƞ𝑠𝑞−ƞ𝑑
ƞ𝑑−ƞ𝑠
∗(1−𝑎𝑡𝑒)
 
The conditions are as follows 
1. Full employee valuation of benefits financed by payroll tax, when 𝑞 = 1 and 𝑎 = 0 
2. Elasticity of supply is zero, ƞs = 0 
3. Elasticity of demand is infinity, ƞd  = ∞ 
If the costs of the payroll tax are equivalent to the value of the health insurance benefit, 
then we would expect no changes in the equilibrium employment and total compensation 
levels.  But given the differential in the payroll tax on the formal sector and the premium 
levels from the informal sector, it is possible that the insurance expansion reduces the 
formal sector employment level, relative to the counterfactual level of employment 
without the payroll tax and generates a deadweight loss.    
2.5 Data and Methodology 
This analysis uses propensity score matching (PSM) with difference in difference (DD) 
on repeated cross sections of the August panel of Indonesia’s national labor force 
participation datasets from 2011 to 2015.  
Methods.  This paper exploits policy features of the reform to identify the impacts of the 
reform on informal sector employment levels and formal sector wages.  The payroll tax 
policy creates natural cut-off points that divide the population into treatment and control 
groups allowing the use of DD estimation to estimate the average treatment effect on the 
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treated while controlling for time-invariant observables.  Yet, population level DD 
regression methodology on repeated cross-sectional data, such as that available in the 
Sakernas, does not control for non-observable temporary individual specific effects 
(Fernandez and Villar 2016).  Combining PSM with DD analysis compares the 
differences in outcomes between the treated and constructed counterfactual control 
groups based on observable covariates.  Kernel matching takes averages of individuals 
weighted by the propensity score of being treated (Villa 2016).    
Exploiting policy-based cutoffs in employment levels.  The identification strategy 
exploits differences in the payroll tax requirements for married and unmarried individuals 
to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT): 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸 [𝐼1 − 𝐼0|𝐷 = 1] = 𝐸[𝐼1|𝐷 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑌0|𝐷 = 1] 
The ATT of exposure to the payroll tax can be interpreted as being the average increase 
in informal employment or log formal sector wages for a randomly selected individual 
who is exposed to a higher payroll tax relative to his counterfactual level of payroll tax. 
A DD regression with observed covariates provides an estimate of the ATT, 𝛿 for the 
dependent variable, 𝐼𝑖𝑡, as follows (Villa 2016):  
(1) 𝛿 = {𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 1, 𝑍𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖] − [𝐼𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 =  0, 𝑋𝑖]} -  
{𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 1, 𝑋𝑖] − 𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0, 𝑋𝑖]} 
The period of interest, t is a dummy variable which represents 0 for the baseline year 
which is 2013, prior to the reform, and 1 for the year 2015, the year after the 
implementation began.   
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The dependent variable, 𝐼𝑖𝑡 of interest is the share of employment in the informal sector 
and log formal sector wages.  
The treatment variable,  𝑍𝑖 is a dummy variable which represents 1 for a treated group 
to which treatment is delivered and 0 for the control group which does not receive 
treatment.   
The treatment approach exploits the change in the payroll tax for unmarried versus 
married employees.  The payroll tax increased for single individuals from three to five 
percentage points (pp) whereas married employees saw a one pp decrease in their 
payroll tax.  This may increase the change in probability of being in the informal sector 
among unmarried workers relative to married workers.   Thus, the treatment group, 𝑍𝑖  is 
a dummy for an individual’s unmarried status.  This includes those who are divorced, 
widowed, or have never married.  This relies on the assumption that any changes in 
formal sector employment behavior between single versus married workers is in 
response to the change in the payroll tax rather than other sectoral trends that divide 
single and married workers.  Also, trends in employment responses by married workers 
are not a true counterfactual since married workers experience a tax decrease.   
The notation 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0| 𝑍𝑖 = 1,0 denotes the requirement that at baseline, t=0 no 
interventions are delivered to the treatment and control group.  Specifically, in 2013 the 
payroll tax was at a pre-reform state for married and unmarried workers.   
Explanatory variables, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 were also included to control for an exogenous treatment 
effect that would predict the treatment variables.  This includes gender, age, high school 
education, rural residence, and a dummy variable for head of the household. 
 
 
54 
 
The main estimation method relies on kernel propensity score matching with 
difference in difference.  The propensity score,  𝑝𝑖 or likelihood of being in the treated 
group is calculated using a probit model based on observed covariates: 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑍𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) 
Kernel PSM takes each treated unit and matches it with the entire sample of control 
units based on their propensity scores.  A kernel function is estimated based on a 
selected bandwidth, ℎ𝑛, to match treated and control groups.  This is used to calculate 
kernel weights: 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝐾(
𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑘
ℎ𝑛
)
∑ 𝐾(
𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑘
ℎ𝑛
)
 
Three types of kernel weights for the control group at baseline (𝑊𝑖𝑡=0
𝐶 ), the control group 
at follow-up (𝑊𝑖𝑡=1
𝐶 ) and the treated group at baseline (𝑊𝑖𝑡=1
𝐶 ) are applied to the 
population DD estimate to yield the kernel weighted propensity score matching 
difference in difference for repeated cross sections (Villa 2016):  
 
(2) 𝛿 = {𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 1, 𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 =  0] ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡=1
𝐶 } -  
{𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0] ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡=0
𝐶 }∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡=0
𝑡  
There are critical assumptions underlying the validity of the PSM DD: 
1. Taking a causal model approach relies on the Stable Unit Treatment 
Variable Assumption (SUTVA) which has two components.  First, the 
intervention and comparison groups completely represent the possible 
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treatments and second, there are no interactions between the groups.   
Changes in the composition of treatment and control groups are common 
with data from repeated cross-sections rather than longitudinal data (Stuart 
2014).  If the payroll tax exposure is properly and evenly applied across 
formal employees who are married/unmarried or individuals above/below the 
income threshold, then the first part of SUTVA holds.  Given the limited tax 
compliance in Indonesia, it is possible that even formal sector employers are 
not fully compliant with tax requirements and thus violate SUTVA.  The 
second part of the SUTVA assumption regarding the lack of interaction 
between groups holds if the payroll tax exposure of a married individual does 
not affect the employment outcomes of an unmarried individual and vice 
versa.    This assumption could be violated within households comprised of a 
mix of adults with married and unmarried individuals who pool their income.  
For example, an unmarried adult child who faced an income reduction 
because of the payroll tax would contribute less to the overall household 
income.  This could influence a married adult in the household, such as a 
retired parent to re-enter the workforce.  Unfortunately, the survey does not 
have sufficient data to measure intra-household decisions.      
2. The unconfoundedness assumption of PSM means that treatment and 
baseline variables are independent of the outcomes.  Specifically, an 
individual’s marital or income status (i.e. income status above and below the 
threshold) are not influenced by the reform and payroll tax change.   The 
differential tax treatment based on marital status prior to the reform favored 
unmarried individuals.  The new payroll tax structure under the reform 
removed the dis-incentive among formal sector employees to marry.   As a 
result, one could expect that the reform would potentially increase the 
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likelihood of marriage.  However, we see the opposite.  There is a statistically 
significant increase in the percent of unmarried people between 2013 and 
2015 among the entire surveyed population.  The share of unmarried people 
increased from 34.2 percent in 2013 to 35.0 percent in 2015 (see table 2.4).    
Marriage rates, in the survey data, have been decreasing between 2010 and 
2015.  This could be due to non-reform related sectoral trends such as the 
concurrent increase in the percent of the population with a high school 
education or increased urbanization, factors that are correlated with and 
could influence marital status.    
 
A PSM DD approach mitigates biases resulting from potential violations from 
the unconfoundedness assumption if unobserved factors that influence 
employment outcomes and exposure to the payroll tax is time-invariant 
(Moreno-Serra 2009). 
 
3. The parallel trends assumption is necessary for internal validity of DD 
analyses.  It establishes that before the reform, the differences between the 
treatment and control groups were constant.  Therefore, differences after the 
reform are driven by the differential impact of the reform on the treated group.   
A visual inspection of the trend in the treatment and control group provides a 
basic way of examining whether the treated and control group’s outcomes 
follow parallel paths in the absence of the payroll tax.  Another test that is 
employed is the placebo test which re-estimates the DD analysis over pre-
reform years of data.  I apply the PSM DD to 2012 and 2013 to confirm if pre-
reform DD results are not statistically significant. 
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Data. The August panel of the Sakernas, the national labor force participation 
datasets from 2011 to 2015.  It provides annual cross-sectional survey data from 
200,000 households.  The survey collects data on household members above the age of 
15.  The type of data includes individual demographic data, types of activities during the 
last week, hours of work and wages, type of employment, and information on those 
looking for work (see table 2.3).   
Table 2.3.  Summary of key statistics 
  2013   2015  
 
Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Informal 
employment as % 
of employed 
53.0% 49.9% 316,336 51.7% 50.0% 332,983 
Unemployment (%) 4.1% 19.9% 495,110 4.1% 19.7% 526,030 
Unmarried (%) 34.2% 47.5% 495,110 35.0% 47.8% 526,030 
Real wage 
(Rupiah, 2011) 
554,606 1,278,957 495,110 574,501 1,416,246 526,030 
Age 38.1 16.2 495,110 38.5 16.2 526,030 
% with high school 
education 
31.5% 46.4% 495,110 34.9% 47.7% 526,030 
Rural (%) 49.3% 50.0% 495,110 46.2% 49.9% 526,030 
Male (%) 49.9% 50.0% 495,110 49.9% 50.0% 526,030 
Head of household 
(%) 
34.9% 47.7% 495,110 35.5% 47.9% 526,030 
 
Source: Sakernas, 2013 and 2015 
Notes: Wages adjusted based on CPI data based on World Bank World Development Indicators 
 
The summary statistics in table 2.3 show that informal sector employment rates 
decreased, and real sector wages increased between 2013 and 2015.  The Sakernas 
data reports nominal wages.  Accounting for inflation, national level CPI produced by the 
World Bank was used to convert Sakernas’s average nominal wages to real wages.   
Between 2011 and 2015, average real wages increased 4 percent.  A proper accounting 
for inflation would incorporate temporal and spatial indices from the Susenas 
consumption modules as weights to account for price increases that can be used to 
convert Sakernas nominal to real wages.   Without this data, the application of national 
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level CPI data would be differenced out in a propensity score matching difference in 
difference analysis.  
The Sakernas survey was designed to collect data on employment and unemployment 
and does not precisely produce categories of employment that align with internationally 
accepted definitions of the informal sector (Allen 2016).     Informal employment was 
defined based on the official definition adopted by BPS, Indonesia’s statistical agency 
and laid out by main employment category and occupation (Alatas et al. 2010).  The 
World Bank’s Indonesia Jobs Report cites the official survey-based definition of the 
formal sector as all employees and employers with permanent workers, and all 
managerial positions, except for those classified as family workers (Alatas et al. 2010).  
The report describes all other combinations as informal, except for the self-employed 
with family workers (Alatas et al. 2010).  Table 2.4 below describes the basis for 
determining whether an individual is in the informal or formal sector based on a 
combination of occupation and employment categories. 
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Table 2.4.  Categorization of the formal and informal sector 
 
Professionals, 
Directors, and 
Managers 
Sales and 
Service 
Agricultural, 
Fishing, 
Forestry 
and Hunting 
Production, 
Transport, 
Unskilled 
Other 
Self-employed Formal Informal Informal Informal Informal 
Self-employed with 
worker 
 
Formal Formal Informal Formal Informal 
Employee with 
permanent worker 
Formal Formal Formal Formal Formal 
 
Employee 
Formal Formal Formal Formal Formal 
 
Casual employee in 
agriculture 
Formal Informal Informal Informal Informal 
 
Casual employee in 
non-agriculture 
Formal Informal Informal Informal Informal 
 
Unpaid 
Informal Informal Informal Informal Informal 
Source: Adapted from Alatas et al. (2010)  
2.6 Results 
Between 2013 and 2015, informal employment declined slightly from 53.0 percent to 
51.7 percent of the workforce.    For women, informal employment decreased from 
57.4 percent to 55.5 percent.  For men, informal employment decreased from 50.3 to 
49.5 percent.  The only statistically significant impact of the reform on employment 
identified, based on the PSM DD analysis, was found among unmarried men who 
experienced a 1.6 percentage point (pp) increase in informal sector employment 
relative to the counterfactual rate of informalization, resulting from the health care 
reform (see table 2.5).  Population level difference in difference estimates identified 
a statistically significant 1.2 pp overall increase in informal sector employment, but 
this result disappears under a PSM DD model specification.    
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Table 2.5.  Impact of reform on informal employment rate 
 
 
(1) Population DD regression 
 
(2) Propensity Score Matching 
with Difference in Difference 
 ATT 
Std 
Error 
Observations 
R-
squared 
ATT 
Std 
Error 
Observations 
Treatment:  Unmarried (treatment) versus married (control) 
Total 
Population 
.012*** 0.002 649,319 0.24 0.001 0.004 649,319 
Women -0.002 0.004 249,837 0.27 -0.002 0.011 249,806 
Men .019*** 0.019 399,482 0.22 0.016*** 0.006 399,211 
NOTE: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Formal sector nominal wages increased by 17 percent across the entire population and 
sub-groups between 2013 and 2015.    The population level DD regression identified a 
minimal increase in wages that disappears under the PSM DD estimation (see table 
2.6).    
Table 2.6. Impact of reform on log of formal sector wages 
 
(1)  
Population DD regression 
(2)  
Propensity Score Matching with 
Difference in Difference 
 ATT 
Std 
Error 
Observations 
R-
squared 
ATT 
Std 
Error 
Observations 
Treatment:  Unmarried (treatment) versus married (control) 
Total 
Population 
-0.020*** 0.007 216,576 0.2 0.002 0.015 216,576 
Women -0.024* 0.013 75,630 0.18 0.002 0.024 75,585 
Men -0.042*** 0.009 140,946 0.2 0.005 0.018 140,873 
NOTE: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
 
Parallel trends assumption tests: 
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A visual inspection of the Sakernas survey data on informal employment rates and 
the log of formal sector wages for the August surveys between 2010 through 2015 
years showed that the 2010 and 2011 data were roughly parallel to each other for 
married and unmarried individuals across the entire population, the male population 
and female populations (see figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4).  Between 2010 and 2011, 
informal employment and log formal sector wages were parallel for the subset of 
men and the entire population. 
Figure 2.2.  Informal employment rates and wages by marriage status, entire 
population 
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Figure 2.3.  Informal employment rates and wages by marriage status, among women 
 
Figure 2.4.  Informal employment rates and wages by marriage status, among men 
 
The parallel trends assumption can also be tested through a “placebo” test.   The 
“placebo” test pretends the pre-treatment period took place at a different starting point.  
Based on this test, the PSM DD test is re-run as though the pre-reform period was 2011 
and the post-reform period was 2012.  Statistical significant PSM DD results between 
2011 and 2012 would demonstrate violations of the parallel trends assumptions.  The 
“placebo” test was run on the specification for informal employment rates for married 
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versus unmarried men, when results from the PSM DD estimation yielded a statistically 
significant reform effect between the 2013 and 2015 time pre-and post-reform time-
period (see table 2.7).   Between 2011 and 2012 there was no statistically significant 
difference in difference result, further verifying the parallel trend for the informal 
employment rates of married and unmarried men. 
Table 2.7.  Placebo test of the parallel treatment assumption 
Outcome Treatment Population ATT Std Error Observations 
Informal 
employment 
rate 
Unmarried Men -0.007 0.007 410,417 
 
The effectiveness of the PSM approach to balance the covariates of the treated and 
control groups based on the propensity score can be measured via a t test to estimate 
whether the outcome variable is orthogonal to the treatment indicator given the observed 
covariates at baseline (Villa 2016).   We see from the t test on the PSM DD specification 
for informal employment among men, that there are still limitations in matching for some 
of the covariates (see table 2.8).  Mean differences between two of the covariates, age 
and high school enrollment, remain between married and unmarried males after 
matching.   
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Table 2.8.  Baseline T test between treated and control groups 
Covariate Mean Control Mean Treated P-value 
Informal 0.528 0.540 0.000*** 
Age 31.461 28.685 0.000*** 
High School 
graduate 
0.285 0.383 0.000*** 
Rural 0.555 0.555 0.791 
Head of Household 0.168 0.168 0.999 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1   
A comparison of the propensity scores for unmarried and married groups before and 
after matching shows the limited number of counterfactuals available for comparison 
between treated and control groups (see figure 2.5). 
Figures 2.5a and 2.5b.  Propensity scores of unmarried (treated) and married (control) 
groups 
Figure 2.5A.  At baseline Figure 2.5b.  After reform 
  
 
2.7 Discussion 
This chapter examined the impact of one feature of the SHI reform, the change in the 
payroll tax on unmarried Indonesians, on informal sector employment and formal sector 
wages.  This contributes to the literature on how social health insurance can impact 
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informal sector employment.  Through the use of propensity score matching with 
difference in difference on Sakernas panel data, we found that the payroll tax impact 
was limited to a 1.6 percentage point increase in informal employment for unmarried 
men relative to the counterfactual trend in formalized employment.   
The SHI reform potentially increased the incentive for unmarried workers to work in the 
informal sector:  1) It increased the payroll tax for unmarried individuals and decreased 
the payroll tax for married individuals and 2) it expanded health insurance to the informal 
sector and therefore broke the tax/benefit linkage created by the connection between 
formal sector payroll taxes and the health insurance benefits that had been exclusive to 
the formal sector.  The reform was implemented nationally which limited the identification 
of a control group that was not exposed to insurance.  We are not able to adequately 
identify if the expansion broke the tax/benefit linkage because both control and treatment 
groups were exposed to the social health insurance reform and only differed in their 
exposure to the changes in the payroll tax.  Instead, this analysis focused on the impact 
of the reform’s differential change in the payroll tax.  Thus, observed changes in informal 
sector employment potentially under-estimate the true impact of the reform on the labor 
market. 
Exploiting the differential change in the payroll tax on married and unmarried workers, 
the analysis employed propensity score matching with difference in difference analysis 
to identify the impact of the change in the payroll tax on informal sector employment and 
formal sector wages.   Over the time-period studied, overall informal sector employment 
decreased, and real wages increased.  The reform’s increase in the payroll tax resulted 
in a 1.6 percentage point increase in informal employment for unmarried men relative to 
the counterfactual trend in formalized employment.  That is, the reform depressed the 
rate of formalization for unmarried men. The reform had no observed wage and informal 
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employment effects on the overall working population within the first two years of the 
reform.    
The limited impact of the social health insurance reform’s change to the payroll tax levels 
for the health benefit and expanded access to the informal sector may be due to the 
following: 1) the change in the payroll tax was too small to influence formal sector 
enrollment, 2) the differences between informal and formal employment in Indonesia are 
too wide to be influenced by the payroll tax, and 3) the study period was too limited to 
observe the full effect of the reform.    
The payroll tax change for unmarried formal sector workers only increased two 
percentage points which may not be large enough of a disincentive to cause formal 
sectors works to switch to the informal sector.  The added protections for formal sector 
workers such as the minimum wages and additional benefits (e.g. old age lump sum 
benefit) may be sufficiently valuable enough to outweigh the increase in the payroll tax 
experienced by unmarried formal sector workers. Even if the health benefit/tax linkage 
may have been violated by the expansion of the reform, there are other benefits that are 
exclusive to the formal sector (e.g. old age benefits).  As a result, the changes under the 
SHI reform may not have been significant enough to shift the supply of employees willing 
to work in the formal sector jobs.   
Most studies on the impact of the adoption of social health insurance have found 
population-wide increase in informal employment with size effects that have varied from 
as little as a 0.4 percentage points from Seguro Popular, to as high as 17 percentage 
points based on cross-national comparisons of countries with and without SHI systems.  
Thailand’s reform may be a more appropriate comparison for Indonesia.  It experienced 
a 2-percentage point change in informal employment in the implementation year that 
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then increased to 10 percentage points three years later.  The Wagstaff et al. (2012) 
analysis of Thailand also examined the effects by marital status and sex, finding an 
increase among married women of about 11.6 and 12.5 percentage points, respectively, 
after three years of the reform’s implementation.  Thailand’s insurance reform increased 
informal sector employment among single and married men by 10.2 and 8.4 percentage 
points after three years of implementation.  Thus it is possible that the effect size for 
Indonesia’s overall and sub-population will be more substantive in the subsequent years 
following the reform.   
Although the impact of the reform has so far been limited to unmarried men, 
policymakers may want to be sensitive to the impact of the payroll tax as part of their 
resource mobilization strategy for funding the health sector.   The SHI is also facing 
increasing SHI deficits amid an inability to cover the nonpoor informal sector at the 
current partial subsidies.   
Indonesia can make significant reforms to its revenue collection system without imposing 
new taxes.  It performs poorly in terms of tax capacity (i.e. ability to collect existing 
taxes), collecting only 50 percent of its potential tax revenues (OECD 2015; World Bank 
2015).    The government of Indonesia, with technical assistance from the World Bank 
and the IMF, has been focused on increasing taxes through better tax administration and 
compliance and expanding the tax base.  The IMF recommended rationalizing income 
taxes and unifying various existing rates – possibly leading the revision in the payroll tax 
(IMF 2015).  
Increasing payroll tax and general revenue tax collection would allow additional financing 
for the health sector.   A cross-national analysis of 89 low and middle-income countries 
found that for every US$100 per capita of additional tax revenues collected, countries 
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increase their government health spending by $9.86 (Reeves et al 2015).  By multiple 
measures, Indonesia currently falls short of normative recommendations on health 
spending.  It spends only 3 percent of GDP and 7 percent of government expenditures 
on health.  The Chatham House (2014) called for a minimum of 5 percent of GDP spent 
on health to achieve UHC and the Abuja target called for a minimum of 15 percent of 
government spending on health (WHO 2011).    Thus a focus on increasing tax 
collection could have beneficial downstream effects for Indonesia’s public-sector 
allocation of resources to the health sector. 
Further analysis is needed to investigate if the reform had an impact on the tax/benefit 
linkage.  The mandate’s gradual phase-in by employee category also limits our ability to 
measure the impact of the reform, since a large proportion of the informal sector had not 
yet been legally required to enroll in insurance during the period studied.   Most informal 
employers and employees are micro-enterprises or independent workers which are not 
mandated to enroll until 2016 and 2019, respectively.  As of December 2017, about 70 
percent of Indonesians were reported to have health insurance coverage (BPJS 2018).   
Most of the remaining uninsured are in the informal sector.  Chapter I discussed reasons 
why it is difficult to enroll the informal sector in UHC schemes.   One reason is the lack of 
trust in institutions and the subsequent skepticism that government will honor its policy to 
deliver health benefits to a population that typically remains outside of formal protection 
mechanisms. Therefore, the potential violation in the tax/benefit linkage may not be 
realized if there is doubt that the informal sector would be able to reliably access the 
same SHI benefits available to the formal sector.   Increased informal sector enrollment 
in health insurance and the resultant access to health care benefits would remove the 
exclusivity associated with the formal sector’s tax/health benefit linkage.   
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Future studies that exploit the gradual phase-in of the mandate may be able to identify if 
the tax/health benefit linkage was violated and consequently, increased the impact on 
informal employment.  If informal employment is found to rise due to the violation of the 
tax/health benefit linkage, mitigating policies should be explored.   This includes further 
differentiating benefits packages that are attractive enough for the informal sector to 
enroll in the social health insurance system but that are not as generous as benefits 
available to the formal sector (Bitran 2014).  Yet this could create a highly inequitable 
two-tiered health care system creating a tradeoff between equity of coverage and impact 
on employment.  In a subsequent chapter, we address questions about equity to a 
certain extent by focusing on the impact of the reform on health outcomes, financial 
protection, and health care utilization among the informal sector. 
The experience of introducing social health insurance across developing countries 
shows that workers are sensitive to issues such as payroll taxes and the relative benefits 
available.  With Indonesia’s large informal sector and efforts to expand their social 
protection mechanisms, policies that potentially influence the tradeoffs between working 
in the formal and informal sector need further analysis.  Future work on the effect of 
differential social protection mechanisms of formalization rates in Indonesia is still 
needed.  The new pension system that came into effect in 2016 introduced a 3 percent 
payroll tax that pays out an annuity at retirement (after vesting for 15 years).  This poses 
an additional policy experiment that could provide insight into the tradeoffs associated 
with formal and informal sector employment.         
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CHAPTER 3 
The health, financial protection and utilization impact of Indonesia’s health insurance 
reform 
 
3.1. Overview: Research question and significance 
 
The chapter identifies the health, health utilization, and financial protection impact of 
Indonesia’s social health insurance reform among the newly enrolled nonpoor informal 
sector.  It builds on chapter I which analyzed the non-price factors affecting the demand 
for SHI among the nonpoor informal sector population.  It also provides evidence of 
health and utilization benefits that weigh against the economic costs to increased 
informal employment and fiscal deficits discussed in chapter II.   It asks, is Indonesia’s 
reform making progress toward achieving UHC objectives for its hard to cover, nonpoor 
informal sector by increasing overall health care utilization and financial protection?   
Using observational data from the Indonesia Family Life Survey, this study explores 
naïve probit and OLS models which assume SHI is exogenous and a set of approaches 
to treat SHI as endogenous, including bivariate probit, two-stage least squares analyses 
and propensity score matching with difference in difference analysis.  Both bivariate 
probit and two-stage least squares analyses find increases in overall outpatient care 
utilization but no change in financial protection nor health outcomes.   
3.2. Background:  Health, Health Care Use, and Financial Protection in 
Indonesia 
 
Indonesia’s 2014 Social Health Insurance reform fits within a complex and partially 
decentralized health system. Details of the reform and a brief history of the various 
insurance schemes that preceded it are described in chapter I.  Policy changes 
associated with the reform have the potential to increase access, improve health 
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outcomes, and strengthen financial protection for the informal sector.   Some relevant 
elements are described below. 
Health outcomes in Indonesia have improved significantly in recent decades but 
Indonesia now faces the dual burden of disease, resulting from the co-existence of 
infectious diseases prevalent in developing countries and an increase in chronic 
illnesses more common in wealthier countries.  Life expectancy increased from 63 to 69 
between 1990 and 2015 (World Bank 2018).  Indonesia came close to achieving the 
health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  Under-five mortality rates fell from 66.5 
per 1,000 live births in 1990 to 27.3 per 1,000 live births in 2015; maternal mortality rates 
fell from 446 in 1990 to 126 in 2015; and about 92.6 percent of mothers in 2016 had a 
skilled birth attendant (UNICEF 2018). Rates of heart disease, stroke and diabetes have 
been increasing in recent years and are among the leading causes of premature death 
(IHME 2018).   
The new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for health have a more ambitious set 
of targets that include ending the AIDS epidemic, addressing non-communicable 
diseases and injuries, as well as achieving “universal health coverage, including 
financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and 
access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines 
for all” (UNDP 2018).   The SDGs do not advocate for any one type of health 
system to achieve UHC but most studies of UHC schemes focus on the role of 
social health insurance systems and/or subsidy programs that finance coverage 
for poor and vulnerable populations.    The evidence, however, around the impact 
of these schemes in developing countries is mixed.  Few developing countries 
have been able to achieve near-universal coverage and most studies that have 
examined the impact of UHC find that while UHC schemes improve health care 
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utilization, there is uncertainty around its impact on health and financial protection 
indicators.    
Measuring the achievement of UHC in a way that is comparable across countries 
is complex.  The WHO and the World Bank developed a service coverage index 
and a set of financial protection indicators as a standardized way of measuring 
UHC.  On these measures, the performance of Indonesia’s progress toward UHC 
seems fine for financial protection but weak on its service coverage index 
measure.  A small fraction of households experienced catastrophic health expenditures.  
Using data from Indonesia’s Susenas household data set, Wagstaff and others estimate 
that about 3.6 percent and 0.4 percent of households spend more than 10 percent and 
25 percent of their household consumption, respectively on out of pocket spending and 
0.07 percent of the population are impoverished because of health spending (World 
Bank 2017).  By this measure of financial protection, Indonesia seems to perform well.  
This indicator, however, masks the low utilization rate of formal health care services.   
There is low demand for formal health care services.  Indonesians on average do not 
spend much on health care (only 3% of GDP is spent on health) and tend not to use 
services when sick.   
The reform eliminated user fees for the insured without imposing any cost-sharing 
requirements.   This reduces the financial barriers for accessing health care and 
minimizes some of the financial burden associated with experiencing health shocks, 
potentially increasing health care utilization and financial protection.   
But it’s not clear if increased health care usage translates into improved health 
outcomes.  The global evidence is limited.   In Indonesia’s case, the health system 
suffers from a constrained supply of quality health care services.  The UHC monitoring 
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reported introduced a service coverage index, which is designed to measure the extent 
to which those who need health services receive quality care to obtain the desired result.  
To do so, the index takes a set of 16 tracer indicators related to reproductive, maternal, 
newborn and child health, infectious disease control, non-communicable diseases, and 
service capacity and access.  On this indicator, Indonesia has a low service coverage 
index measure of 49 (out of a 100), which places it among countries in the second 
lowest quintile of performance.  By comparison, the global average is 64 and Sub-
Saharan Africa’s is 42 which has the lowest regional value (World Bank 2017).      
The reform creates pathways for strengthening supply and improving the incentive 
environment for health care providers to deliver quality care.  The SHI reform generated 
an additional source of financing.  It also instituted additional provider payment 
mechanisms, which allows public money to follow the patient.   With the introduction of 
SHI, the nominal amount of government health spending increased 15 percent in 2014 
relative to 2012 (Mahendradhata 2017).   SHI pays primary care providers a capitated 
rate based on the number of insured individuals who register with a primary care 
provider, which serves as the first point of contact for accessing health care services.   
Aside from SHI funding flows, public financing streams for primary care mostly rely on 
passive purchasing mechanisms, such as budgetary transfers from the central or local 
government for salaries and operating and capital costs.    
This chapter looks at the reform’s impact on household changes to health care 
utilization, health outcomes, and financial protection among the nonpoor informal sector.   
The analysis uses the Indonesia Family Life Survey which provides more detailed 
information on health and poverty outcomes.  It is only representative of 83 percent of 
the population and does not survey parts of Eastern Indonesia, including remote islands.  
The IFLS has different survey questions and sampling populations that prevent it from 
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being comparable to the Susenas survey, which are described in the methodology 
section.  It is also does not measure all the health care indicators that constitute the 
UHC health service coverage index.  The IFLS also includes a health measurement 
module which expands beyond the UHC index to measure health impact. 
3.3. UHC’s impact on access and utilization, financial protection, and health 
in developing countries 
 
In developing country contexts, health care is under-utilized, health outcomes are poorer 
than that of developed country counterparts, and the lack of formal risk protection 
mechanisms place individuals at financial risk in the face of adverse health outcomes. 
The introduction of formal insurance mechanisms in developing countries have the 
potential to redress some of these challenges.    
The evidence on the impact on insurance, particularly among the informal sector in 
developing countries is not well developed.  The challenge to developing the evidence 
on insurance in developing countries is the reliance on observational data, with limited 
use of approaches to address potential endogeneity resulting from adverse selection.  
While social health insurance reforms in developing countries have become more 
widespread in the last two decades, there is less programmatic evidence.  Studies of the 
impact of health insurance schemes in developing countries have found a mix of results 
related to utilization, financial protection and health outcomes.     Most studies find that 
insurance enhances health care usage, but it can potentially increase out of pocket 
spending and limit financial protection.  The evidence on health outcomes is the least 
developed with most studies finding little to no impact on health.   
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Health care utilization 
Chapter I described the theory of demand for health insurance and how the zero-marginal 
cost of health care increases demand for health care above the counterfactual level of 
health care consumption, in the absence of health insurance.   In Indonesia, we would 
expect that, conditional on enrolling in social health insurance, the removal of user fees 
and lack of cost-sharing arrangements at mostly public facilities should increase utilization, 
primarily at public sector facilities and to a lesser extent at private facilities, since some 
private facilities are also empaneled.       
Several studies of developing country reforms have concluded that insurance has had an 
overall positive impact on health care access and utilization, either through an increase in 
overall access and utilization or a substitution away from informal or self-care towards 
more formal care.    More nuanced analyses point out that the impact of coverage 
expansion may depend on different measures of access and utilization.  For example, one 
study on China finds that an insurance scheme increased hepatitis B immunizations but 
had no impact on inpatient and outpatient utilization (Wagstaff et al. 2007).      In Vietnam, 
the expansion of free insurance to children under six increased inpatient and outpatient 
utilization (Palmer et al. 2015).  
Some studies have looked at access and utilization, finding that often the poorest benefit 
the most from universal coverage expansions (Trujillo 2005; Giedion et al. 2007; Sosa-
Rubi et al. 2009; Panpiemras et al. 2011).  Some recent studies on schemes in China 
have found that the highest income quintiles also experienced large improvements in 
access (Yip et al. 2008, Wagstaff et al. 2009).  
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Financial Protection   
The literature on financial protection provided by UHC schemes is mixed.  The effect on 
financial protection varies depending on the structure of the insurance package, which 
providers are empaneled, what benefits are provided, and if there are cost sharing 
requirements.    Indonesia’s SHI provides a comprehensive set of services at public 
facilities and some private hospitals with no cost sharing requirements.   Insurance 
enrollment would thus potentially reduce financial costs at the point of service.   
Common indicators of the impact on financial protection look at changes in out-of-pocket 
spending (OOPS), catastrophic expenditures, and impoverishment due to health 
spending.  These may be over-simplistic views of the impact on financial protection.  For 
example, while a health insurance reform may reduce user fees, it may also increase 
utilization and therefore have an ambiguous effect on out of pocket spending.  Some 
studies have found no effect on OOPS (Wagstaff et al. 2009).  A study of Vietnam’s 
insurance expansion to children under six found no effect on OOPS (Palmer et al. 2015).  
Other studies have found an increase in health spending.  A study of India’s RSBY 
insurance scheme for the poor found no impact on inpatient expenditures but found a 
marginal decrease in catastrophic spending due to inpatient expenditures and a 30 
percent increase in the probability of incurring OOPS (Karan et al. 2017).  In Peru, an 
expansion in insurance coverage resulted in a statistically significant increase in OOPS 
(and health care utilization), which the authors argue is welfare enhancing because 
insurance leads to greater awareness of health problems and therefore generates 
demand for health care services (Bernal et al. 2017).  Other studies have postulated that 
limited financial protection from health reforms may be a consequence of poor provider 
incentives and benefit design.  For example, China’s New Cooperative Medical Scheme 
model which combines a Medical Savings Account with a high deductible catastrophic 
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insurance fails to consider the population’s high rates of chronic conditions, which 
require more frequent low-cost visits (Yip and Hsiao 2009).   
Also, methodologically, financial protection studies focus on health expenditures as a 
share of total household expenditures without looking into the impact on household 
assets or informal networks.  Households may have alternative means of financing 
health care costs that are uncorrelated with their household expenditures.  Such studies 
on financial protection often fail to capture the effect of health shocks on asset 
accumulation or use of informal networks.   
A recent analysis of the 2003 and 2004 Susenas survey, assessed coping mechanisms 
by Indonesian households in the face of illness.  It found that illness does lead to a 
statistically significant increase in OOPS.    Households typically borrow as the primary 
coping strategy, but poor and rural households are more likely to cope with illness by 
reducing their non-food expenditures (Sparrow et al. 2014).  This highlights the 
challenges to using consumption data as a measure of financial protection.  The primary 
use of borrowing as a coping mechanism would not affect the use of expenditures as the 
basis for measuring financial protection. 
Despite the flaws in these financial protection indicators, some studies do confirm an 
improvement in financial protection status (Nguyen et al. 2012; Galarraga et al. 2010).  A 
voucher program to increase maternal and child health care in Bangladesh led to a 
significant decrease in OOPS, amounting to 64 percent of average monthly household 
expenditures (Nguyen et al. 2012).  Mexico’s Seguro Popular led to a 54 percent 
national decrease in catastrophic health expenditures (Galarraga et al. 2010). 
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Health outcomes    
The human capital model of demand for health describes health as both an investment 
and consumption commodity that figures into an individual choice function (Grossman 
2000).  This implies that health is endogenous, in that individuals decide on their optimal 
level of health and health investments balanced against those opportunity costs.   
Investments in health such as the time and travel to seek health care have an 
opportunity cost.  In developing country contexts, this is highlighted by the long 
distances and limited availability of health care providers which serve as barriers to 
health care access.  Long travel times to health care providers who are only available 
during patient’s work hours translate into lost work time.   In developing country contexts, 
access to a UHC scheme partially lowers the investment costs associated with seeking 
health care but other factors may limit the return on investment in seeking health care, 
such as low service quality.  Many developing countries, including Indonesia have a low 
supply of health care workers who can deliver quality health care services.   As a result, 
increased health care may not translate into improved health outcomes.    
Few papers have effectively measured a positive impact of insurance on health 
outcomes (Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005;  Wang et al. 2009;  Gertler et al. 2011).  
Vietnam’s health insurance program was found to improve child malnutrition indicators 
(Wagstaff and Pradhan 2005).   A community-based health insurance program in China 
improved self-reported health indicators (Wang et al. 2009).   Plan Nacer in Argentina 
increased newborn birth weights and Apgar scores through an increase in antenatal care 
utilization (Gertler et al. 2011). A study on the impact of community- based health 
insurance in Nigeria found a statistically significant decrease in systolic and diastolic 
blood pressure within two years of the CBHI introduction (Hendriks et al. 2014).  More 
papers show no, or ambiguous health outcome affects than papers that show positive 
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impacts (Hamid et al. 2011; Lei and Lin 2009; Giedion et al. 2007; Cuevas and Parker 
2011; King et al. 2009; Carrin et al. 2004; Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 2009).   This 
ambiguity may not necessarily be due to the program under assessment but because of 
the limitations in methodology or data quality.    
Analyses of Indonesia’s health reforms 
A few studies have looked at Indonesia’s different health reforms.  Johar (2009) used the 
IFLS panels up to 2000 to assess the impact of a 1994 program to distribute health 
cards that exempted the poor from user fees at public facilities.  Johar (2009) found an 
increase in utilization of contraceptives among eligible females but no impact on 
increasing access and utilization of the public health system speculating that a price 
subsidy is not the only barrier to health care access.  The author attributed this to the 
persistence of poor perceptions of the health system along with other barriers (e.g. 
education, travel costs and time) that could not be overcome by this demand side 
intervention (Johar 2009).  A competing analysis using Susenas data following the 
expansion of the health card program after the Asian Financial Crisis found an increase 
in utilization primarily among the poor.  The post-Asian Financial Crisis reform also 
increased block grants to local governments, which increased utilization primarily for the 
better-off (Pradhan et al. 2007).     
A separate study looked at the effect of the mandatory health insurance program for civil 
servants (Askes) on access and utilization, also using IFLS panel data up to 2000 
(Cuevas and Parker 2011).   One cross-sectional analysis used a multinomial logit 
analysis on the 1997/8 panel of the IFLS to assess the equity of access in mandatory 
health insurance (Hidayat et al. 2004).   While outpatient utilization increased among civil 
servants and private employees, the reform did not have a positive impact on equity.  A 
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study using SUSENAS data between 2005 and 2006 found that the 2005 Askeskin 
program increased outpatient utilization and out-of-pocket expenditures among urban 
residents (Sparrow et. al. 2013).  The most recent analysis of the current 2014 reform 
used a logistic regression analysis to analyze Susenas data, finding that Indonesia’s 
health insurance reform was associated with a 69 percent and 24 percent increase in 
inpatient and outpatient utilization between 2013 and 2016 (USAID 2017).   
3.4. Methodology 
This analysis uses the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS), which is a longitudinal 
data set that captures household health care spending, utilization and some health 
outcomes.   The main estimation strategies, a bivariate probit analysis and two-stage 
least squares aim to address endogeneity of social health insurance on 2015 data of the 
fifth panel of the IFLS.  It compares results to naïve models, probit and OLS, which 
assume that social health insurance is exogeneous.  It also compares results to 
propensity score matching with difference in difference between the fourth and fifth panel 
of IFLS, which addresses time-invariant selection issues.  
The IFLS dataset is representative of roughly 83 percent of the population in 1993 with 
data on individuals from over 10,000 households in 13 of the 26 provinces in the country.  
Subsequent panels interviewed the same or split-off households.  Application of cross-
sectional person and household weights for each panel allows the waves to be nationally 
representative for each time-period.  The IFLS has data on types of health insurance 
enrollment, health benefits and utilization, physical health, and subjective well-being 
assessments.   It uses the fourth and fifth panel of the IFLS to model a propensity score 
matching with difference in difference analysis.  It uses the recent panel to employ cross-
sectional analyses.  Data from the fifth panel will focus on households surveyed between 
January and October 2015 to ensure that outcomes observed reflect at least one year of 
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implementation.   This analysis is restricted to the nonpoor informal sector.  The 
definition of the informal sector is based on survey categories that include the self-
employed, unpaid family workers, and casual workers in agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors.   This statistical definition has been previously employed in an analysis of 
informal sector employment using the IFLS data (Hohberg et al 2015).   Individuals who 
self-reported receiving full subsidization were excluded to focus on the nonpoor 
population comparable to the analysis in chapters 1 and 2.   Additional data collected by 
the Ministry of Health on the regional availability of private hospitals from 2016 is used 
as a proxy for supply constraints. 
Measuring financial protection, health, and utilization 
This section describes the approach to constructing the outcome variables used in the 
analyses (see table 3.1). 
Health care utilization 
Six binary health care utilization variables were constructed to measure if nonpoor 
informal sector individuals sought inpatient or outpatient care.  It looked at public 
inpatient care, private inpatient care, public outpatient care, and private outpatient care. 
Health utilization data is based on questions that asked respondents to recall their usage 
of inpatient services in the last 12 months and outpatient services in the last four weeks 
before the survey.   This includes data on inpatient care in a public hospital, puskesmas 
(public clinic), private hospital, private clinic, or other.  Similarly, survey results on 
outpatient services in the last four weeks specify where care was sought (public hospital, 
puskesmas, private hospital, private clinic, private doctor, nurse/paramedic/midwife, or 
traditional provider).  In general, inpatient utilization is limited, only about four percent 
visited an inpatient facility in 12 months prior to being surveyed.    Outpatient utilization is 
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higher, with 18 percent visiting an outpatient facility in the 4 weeks prior to being 
surveyed. 
Financial protection will be measured based on internally accepted recommendations 
outlined in the UHC monitoring report (World Bank 2017).  Catastrophic spending on 
health indicators measure out of pocket spending on health (without reimbursement from 
a third-party payer) relative to a medical spending threshold, a proxy for an individual’s 
ability to pay.  This is measured through a binary variable, based on the incidence of 
OOPS exceeding 10 percent and 25 percent of per capita consumption.   Using the 
IFLS, rates of catastrophic spending are 11 percent and 8 percent, respectively.   On 
average, individuals spend only 3 percent of their total consumption on health.  This is 
much higher than Susenas results because of differences in the way that the financial 
protection data was collected between the two surveys.  
Household spending on medical care as a share of total household consumption is also 
examined as a measure of financial protection. Household consumption as measured by 
data collected on monthly household expenditures is commonly used instead of income.  
Using consumption instead of income accounts for how households can borrow or use 
savings in the face of economic shocks such as the costs of addressing an adverse 
health event.  The downside of consumption is that households that borrow are 
perceived to be better off than those that do not (World Bank 2017).   The IFLS survey 
data, as part of their consumption data collects medical expenditure information by 
asking for the aggregate amount spent on hospitalization, clinic charges, physician’s 
fees, traditional healer’s fees, medicines and the like (Strauss et al. 2016).  This 
captures expenditures on modern public and private health care including traditional 
medicine.  Per capita level expenditures are then captured by dividing household 
expenditures by household size.  
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Health outcomes 
A special survey on health measurements was delivered through a physical examination 
of adults aged 15 and older to understand true health conditions.  It collected information 
on height, weight, blood pressure, peak meter flow lung capacity, grip strength, and 
timed sit to stand.   Finally, the interviewer assessed the health of the person surveyed 
based on status of other people of the same age and sex.  Height and weight data will 
be used to inform body-mass index measures.   Additional data on blood pressure, lung 
capacity, grip strength, and sit to stand data will be analyzed.   These data points are 
available in both the fourth and fifth panels of the IFLS.  
Based on the survey data’s diastolic and systolic blood pressure measure, a 
hypertension binary variable was created using guidelines by the American Heart 
Association.  Hypertension is diagnosed when systolic mm HG is 130 or higher or when 
diastolic mm HG is 80 mm HG or higher (AHA 2017).  Based on these thresholds, 
hypertension among adult nonpoor informal sector Indonesians is high at around 31 
percent.  
A continuous variable for body mass index (BMI) was constructed based on height and 
weight measurements.  The mean BMI index was 23.6 kg/m2, which is within the normal 
weight range (BMI<18.5 kg/m2: underweight; 18.5–24.9kg/m2: normal weight; 25.0–
29.9kg/m2: overweight and; ≥30.0 kg/m2: obese). 
A continuous variable was created based on lung capacity, which was measured using a 
peak flow meter. This measure is primarily useful for diagnosing lung problems such as 
asthma, emphysema or chronic bronchitis (JHU 2018).    Healthy peak flow readings 
vary depending on age, height, and sex. 
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Grip strength was taken using a dynamometer on the dominant hand.  Low grip strength 
has been found to be correlated with premature mortality, the development of disability, 
and recovery from hospitalization or surgery (Bohannon 2008).  Average grip strength 
readings vary by age, height and sex. 
The sit to stand test timed respondents while they rose from sitting on a plastic stool 
brought by the interviews to a standing position five times (Strauss et al. 2016).  The sit 
to stand test is used as a measure of functional strength that approximates how the body 
functions on an everyday basis (Bohannon et al. 2010).  
BMI, lung capacity, grip strength and the sit to stand test are health measurements that 
reflect long term effects of environment exposure, health habits or track with one’s age 
progression.  They may be less responsive to the immediate effects of health care use.  
Hypertension might be responsive to health insurance.  As the Rand health insurance 
experiment demonstrated improved blood pressure control for those randomized into 
free health care relative to those with plans with higher cost sharing (Keeler et al. 1985). 
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Table 3.1.  Summary characteristics of the nonpoor informal sector, 2015 
Variable 
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
% enrolled in social health insurance 
5,062 11.6% 32.0% 0 1 
% spending more than 10% of total expenditures on 
health 
5,098 11.2% 31.6% 0 1 
% spending more than 25% of total expenditures on 
health 
5,098 7.8% 26.8% 0 1 
% of total expenditures spent on health 
4,793 2.5% 6.1% 0% 68% 
% who had at least one visit to an inpatient facility in 
last year 
5,098 4.1% 19.8% 0 1 
% who had at least one visit to a public inpatient facility 
in last year 
5,059 2.4% 15.3% 0 1 
% who had at least one visit to a private inpatient 
facility in last year 
5,059 2.4% 15.4% 0 1 
% who had at least one visit to an outpatient facility in 
last month 
5,098 18.2% 38.6% 0 1 
% who had at least one visit to a public outpatient 
facility in last month 
5,098 5.0% 21.7% 0 1 
% who had at least one visit to a private outpatient 
facility in last month 
5,098 15.2% 35.9% 0 1 
% with hypertension 
5,098 31.1% 46.3% 0 1 
BMI (kg/m2) 
4,810 23.5 4.6 12.6 51.4 
Lung capacity based on Peak flow (L/min) 
4,786 352.8 113.3 0.0 773.3 
Grip strength (kg) 
4,774 29.5 10.0 3.5 65.5 
Sit to stand (seconds) 
4,683 7.4 4.0 1.3 87.9 
Source: IFLS V 2015 respondents only 
Model Specifications 
Multiple model specifications will be employed to assess the impact of social health 
insurance on health care utilization, financial protection and health outcomes.  The reform 
was implemented nationally and simultaneously for all Indonesians, so there are no 
obvious treatment assignment rules that can be exploited to instrument for enrollment in 
SHI.  As a result, there are potential adverse selection issues that result from sicker 
individuals being more likely to both enroll in insurance and use and pay for health care 
services.  This analysis will start with naïve models, probit and OLS analyses that assume 
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exogeneity and then employ quasi-experimental techniques that include the use of 
community engagement as an instrumental variable using two-stage least squares, 
bivariate probit, and propensity score matching with difference in difference (PSM-DID) to 
address potential endogeneity.      
SHI as an exogenous regressor 
Assuming SHI is exogeneous, a probit analysis will be employed, as follows: 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖 = 1|𝑋) =  ɸ(𝛼 +  𝑆𝐻𝐼 + 𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀) 
where Yi, represents binary response variables such as the financial protection indicators, 
health care utilization, and hypertension variables.  SHI represents a binary indicator of 
enrollment in social health insurance and 𝑋𝑖, represents a vector of socio-economic and 
demographic characteristics identified in chapter I.  Probit coefficients can be analyzed to 
produce marginal effects.  For binary dependent variables, such as social health 
insurance, the marginal effect explains how going from not having SHI to having SHI 
increases the effect on the outcome of interest.   
For comparison, an OLS analysis will be employed that also assumes SHI is exogenous. 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝑆𝐻𝐼 + 𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀 
Treating SHI as an endogenous regressor 
Enrollment in Social Health Insurance may suffer from selection issues.  As discussed in 
chapter I, individuals may adversely select into insurance enrollment creating endogeneity 
issues.   Based on the analysis put forth in chapter I, a potential instrumental variable 
includes participation in women’s association activities, which are community level 
volunteer organizations set up by the government and support the implementation of 
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programs to enhance women’s welfare and economic and political participation (JICA 
1999).   These associations have also been used to disseminate awareness of the 2014 
health insurance reform (BPJS 2017).  Chapter l showed that participation in these 
associations increased the probability of enrollment in the social health insurance system 
among the informal sector by 5 percentage points.      
The two-stage least square estimation of 𝑌𝑖 includes a representation of health care 
utilization (of public and private health care providers), financial protection or health 
outcomes.  The first stage estimate will take the following form: 
𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑍𝑖 + X𝑖 + 𝜇 
where SHI, social health insurance is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for 
enrollment and 0 for non-enrollment,  𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑖 ∈ {0,1}.   Estimation of the first-stage equation 
will use the binary variable, participation in a women’s association activity as an 
instrument, 𝑍𝑖 ∈ {0,1}.   Fitted estimates of 𝑆𝐻𝐼?̂? from the first stage will be plugged into the 
second stage, which will take the following form: 
𝑌𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝑆𝐻𝐼?̂? + 𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀 
An instrument must satisfy two conditions, it should satisfy the zero-conditional mean 
assumption and be independent of the outcome of interest, such that Cov(𝑌𝑖, 𝑍𝑖)=0 and 
the E[SHI|𝑍𝑖 = 1]  ≠ E[SHI|𝑍𝑖 = 0]. 
The appropriateness of the instrument depends on the robustness of the IV.   Tests for 
under-identification, weak identification, and over identification will check the robustness 
of the instrument. Tests for exogeneity via a Hausman test will be employed to confirm 
the appropriateness of an IV approach.   
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Bivariate probit analysis: 
The use of OLS to estimate insurance uptake may not be an appropriate estimation 
strategy for the first stage equation when SHI is a binary endogenous regressor (Angrist 
et al. 2009).  Health care utilization, financial protection, and hypertension variables are 
binary response variables.  As an alternative, Angrist and Pischke (2009) recommend 
calculating maximum-likelihood estimates of a bivariate probit model to deal with truly non-
linear binary endogenous regressors.  A bivariate probit model is estimated as follows: 
  
𝑆𝐻𝐼?̂? = 𝟏[𝑋𝑖 + 𝑍𝑖 + x𝑖 > 𝑣𝑖] 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝟏[𝑋𝑖 + 𝑆𝐻𝐼?̂? + x𝑖 > 𝜀𝑖] 
This model requires strong parametric assumptions.  It assumes homoscedastic 
bivariate normal errors for (𝑣𝑖 , 𝜀𝑖)~𝑁(0, ∑) and a constant treatment effect so that the 
average treatment effects for any subpopulation are assumed to be the same for any 
subpopulation (Nichols 2011).  We also use bootstrap confidence intervals and apply a 
Rao score test for the goodness of fit to detect non-normal data-generating processes 
that undermine the strong assumption of joint normality of the error distributions 
(Chiburis et al. 2011).   
A two-stage least squares analysis consistently produces an IV estimate of the local 
average treatment effect, but not so for the average treatment effect.  Instead, a 
bivariate probit produces marginal effects which can be used to approximate average 
treatment effects and average treatment effects on the treated.  Chiburis et al. (2011) 
compares these two approaches finding that the effect sizes can differ significantly 
especially with sample sizes fewer than 5,000 or when treatment probabilities are low.  
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An IV model can result in confidence intervals that are too conservative resulting in over-
rejection of true null hypotheses.  Bivariate probit models are not conservative enough 
but this can be addressed with boot-strapped standard errors. 
Propensity score matching with difference in difference analysis 
An alternative estimation strategy is propensity score matching with difference in 
difference (PSM-DID) which can control for time-invariant observable and unobserved 
characteristics such as (time-invariant) adverse selection tendencies of enrollees (Johar 
2009; Wagstaff and Yu 2007; Yip et al. 2008; Moreno-Serra 2008).    It will be employed 
to identify the average effect (e.g. financial protection, utilization, health outcomes) on 
those who newly enrolled in social health insurance in 2014 compared to those who 
consistently did not have social health insurance.  The analysis uses the fourth panel of 
the IFLS which was collected in 2007/2008, well before the implementation of the social 
health insurance reform and the fifth panel was surveyed between 2014 and 2015.  Only 
respondents who took the survey in 2015 were analyzed as part of the after-reform 
sample to allow for sufficient time to capture the impact of at least one full year of the 
reform.   This analysis is restricted to individuals with observations in both the fourth 
panel and the 2015 portion of the fifth panel.  The analyzed sample was further restricted 
to the informal sector, those who did not have fully subsidized SHI in 2015, and those 
who did not have social health insurance in 2007.  It also excluded those who reported 
having SHI in 2007 to provide an appropriate control for those who are newly eligible to 
enroll in the contributory insurance program (see table 3.2 for a summary of 
characteristics between the two waves).   
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Table 3.2.  Summary characteristics across 2007 and 2014 waves 
  2007    2014  
  
Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev  
 Obs Mean Std. Dev 
Catastrophic health expenditure, > 10% 
of total expenditure 
5,583 4.6% 20.9%  6,882 5.3% 22.5% 
Catastrophic health expenditure, > 25% 
of total expenditure 
5,583 1.3% 11.3%  6,882 1.7% 12.8% 
Health expenditure as a % of total 
household expenditure 
5,583 2.1% 5.2%  6,510 2.8% 6.3% 
Inpatient use 5,721 3.0% 17.0%  6,882 4.4% 20.4% 
Public inpatient use 5,721 1.5% 12.0%  6,859 1.9% 13.7% 
Private inpatient use 5,721 1.5% 12.1%  6,859 2.0% 14.1% 
Outpatient use 5,723 8.5% 27.9%  6,882 19.0% 39.2% 
Public outpatient use 5,723 3.2% 17.5%  6,858 3.1% 17.1% 
Private outpatient use 5,723 9.1% 28.8%  6,858 10.4% 30.6% 
Hypertension 11,073 36.8% 48.2%  6,882 67.2% 47.0% 
BMI (kg/m2) 10,658 24.4 91.6  6,828 23.4 4.7 
Lung capacity (mm HG) 6,811 287.9 102.6  6,749 331.8 110.0 
Grip strength (kg) 5,675 28.1 11.2  6,734 27.3 9.7 
Sit to stand (seconds) 5,574 7.1 3.1  6,524 7.6 4.4 
Age 5,815 39.3 15.5  6,881 41.3 16.6 
Male  11,219 44.5% 49.7%  6,882 42% 49% 
Married 11,219 39.0% 48.8%  6,881 70% 46% 
Household size 5,723 4.2 1.9  6,882 4.0 1.8 
Log of per capita expenditure 5,583 13.0 0.7  6,510 13.8 0.7 
Literate 5,727 88.0% 32.5%  6,882 87.9% 32.6% 
Education        
     Some elementary or less 5,312 39.3% 48.8%  6,471 35.5% 47.9% 
 
     Some high school 
 
5,312 51.4% 50.0%  6,471 46.0% 49.8% 
     High school graduate and above 5,312 9.3% 29.0%  6,471 18.4% 38.7% 
    Other 5,312 0.1% 2.3%  6,471 0.1% 3.0% 
Smoker 5,724 27,7% 44.7%  6,864 32.2% 46.7% 
Chronic illness 5,724 15.9% 36.6%  6,862 33.5% 47.2% 
Rural 11,219 51.7% 50.0%  6,882 47.8% 50.0% 
Less than an hour to a public facility 5,719 94.6% 22.7%  6,882 92.6% 26.2% 
Sources:  IFLS IV and V 
 
 
91 
 
The main estimation method relies on kernel propensity score matching with 
difference in difference (Villa 2016).  The propensity score,  𝑝𝑖, or likelihood of being in 
the treated group is calculated, using a probit model based on observed covariates: 
𝑝𝑖 = 𝐸(𝑍𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) 
Observed covariates include household demographic and socio-economic status (e.g. 
expenditure, education), health care knowledge and health care supply conditions (e.g. 
proximity to a primary care clinic).  The quality of the matching is determined by the fit of 
the propensity score and the overlap of the common support.  
Kernel PSM takes each treated unit and matches it with the entire sample of control 
units based on their propensity score.  A kernel function is estimated based on a 
selected bandwidth, ℎ𝑛, to match treated and control groups.  This is used to calculate 
kernel weights: 
𝑤𝑖 =
𝐾(
𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑘
ℎ𝑛
)
∑ 𝐾(
𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑘
ℎ𝑛
)
 
Three types of kernel weights for the control group at baseline (𝑊𝑖𝑡=0
𝐶 ), the control group 
at follow-up (𝑊𝑖𝑡=1
𝐶 ) and the treated group at baseline (𝑊𝑖𝑡=1
𝐶 ) are applied to the 
population DD estimate to yield the kernel weighted propensity score matching 
difference in difference:  
 𝛿 = {𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 1, 𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=1|𝐷𝑖𝑡=1 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 =  0] ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡=1
𝐶 } -  
{𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡=0|𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸[𝐼𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0, 𝑍𝑖 = 0] ∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡=0
𝐶 }∗ 𝑊𝑖𝑡=0
𝑡  
where 𝛿, is an estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated. 
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There are critical assumptions underlying the validity of the PSM DD: 
1. Taking a causal model approach relies on the Stable Unit Treatment 
Variable Assumption (SUTVA) which has two components.  First, the 
intervention and comparison groups completely represent the possible 
treatments and second, there are no interactions between the groups.   The 
binary characteristics of the social health insurance variable fully capture the 
possible treatments of enrollment or non-enrollment.  The second part of the 
SUTVA assumption regarding the lack of interaction between groups holds if 
social health insurance enrollment does not affect the health care usage, 
financial protection or health outcomes of a non-enrollee and vice versa.  The 
second part of the SUTVA assumption regarding the lack of interaction 
between groups could be violated if there are within household interaction 
effects.   This could be controlled for through household clustering of 
standard errors.      
    
2. The unconfoundedness assumption means that treatment and baseline 
variables are independent of the outcomes.  Changes in the composition of 
treatment and control groups are common with data from repeated cross-
sections rather than longitudinal data (Stuart 2014).  Within a difference in 
difference specification, time-invariant unobservable confounding factors 
would be differenced out.   This assumption is employed as a means of 
addressing time-invariant adverse selection over the period studied (Johar 
2009).   A potential flaw is that adverse selection behavior is time varying.  
That is, health risks may change as people age and therefore, the resulting 
selection tendencies will change accordingly.   
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3. The parallel trends assumption is necessary for internal validity of difference 
in difference analyses.  It establishes that before the reform, the differences 
between the treatment and control groups were constant.  Therefore, 
differences after the reform are driven by the differential impact of the reform 
on the treated group.   A visual inspection of the trend in the treatment and 
control group provides a basic way of examining whether the treated and 
control groups’ outcomes follow parallel paths.     
3.5. Results 
A t-test of the key explanatory variables shows that among the nonpoor informal sector, 
those with SHI tend to have statistically significantly different levels of spending on 
health, rates of health care utilization, BMI and grip strength (see table 3.3). 
Table 3.3.  T-test of outcome variables 
  Uninsured SHI enrollees     
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev Mean 
Std. 
Dev. t p 
% spending more than 10% of total expenditures 
on health 10.9% 31.2% 13.1% 33.7% -1.820 0.069 
% spending more than 25% of total expenditures 
on health 7.6% 26.5% 8.5% 27.9% -0.993 0.321 
% of total expenditures spent on health 2.4% 6.1% 2.7% 5.9% -2.064 0.039 
% who had at least one visit to an inpatient 
facility in last year 2.6% 15.8% 9.7% 29.6% -9.530 0.000 
% who had at least one visit to a public inpatient 
facility in last year 1.2% 10.8% 4.4% 20.5% -6.709 0.000 
% who had at least one visit to a private inpatient 
facility in last year 1.1% 10.2% 4.5% 20.7% -6.129 0.000 
% who had at least one visit to an outpatient 
facility in last month 16.9% 37.4% 23.1% 42.2% -4.037 0.000 
% who had at least one visit to a public outpatient 
facility in last month 3.9% 19.5% 7.0% 25.5% -2.869 0.004 
% who had at least one visit to a private 
outpatient facility in last month 14.1% 34.8% 18.0% 38.5% -3.040 0.002 
% with hypertension 30.5% 46.0% 33.4% 47.2% -0.838 0.402 
BMI (kg/m2) 23.4 4.6 24.3 4.9 -3.940 0.000 
Lung capacity based on Peak flow (L/min) 352.7 112.6 355.3 117.8 0.878 0.380 
Grip strength (kg) 29.5 9.9 29.3 10.2 1.981 0.048 
Sit to stand (seconds) 7.4 4.1 7.1 3.2 0.852 0.394 
T= t-statistic from two-tailed, two-sample hypothesis test ; p = p-value 
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The estimation strategies consistently found that social health insurance improved 
outpatient utilization.  It also led to improvement in some health outcomes, but it had no 
positive impact on financial protection.  The following discusses the results across the 
naïve, two-stage least squares, bivariate probit, and PSM DD models.  
Health care utilization 
Based on the bivariate probit analysis, social health insurance enrollment resulted in an 
increase in the probability of utilization of outpatient facilities overall and at public and 
private facilities by 0.225, 0.155, and 0.203 (see table 3.4).  The average use of 
outpatient, public outpatient, and private outpatient facilities among those without SHI is 
16.8 percent, 7.0 percent, and 18 percent.  Although the size effect varied, statistical 
significance of the impact of SHI on overall rate of outpatient utilization was validated by 
the two-stage least squares estimation strategy.    The PSM DD also identified a 
statistically significant impact of SHI on outpatient and other types of health care usage, 
discussed later (see table 3.8). 
The naïve probit found that social health insurance increased all levels of usage.  The 
OLS also indicated a statistically significant positive association between SHI enrollment 
and utilization for all types of care except private sector outpatient utilization. Hausman 
tests for two-stage least squares utilization models rejected a null hypothesis of 
exogeneity for the model specification for modeling overall inpatient and public inpatient 
utilization, favoring treatment of SHI as an endogenous regressor.   The Hausman test 
failed to reject a null hypothesis of exogeneity for the private inpatient utilization and the 
public utilization models.  This suggests that the naïve probit model may be a sufficient 
model for estimating the impact of SHI on private inpatient and public utilization.   SHI 
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had a larger size effect on private inpatient and outpatient care relative to public care, 
with a 10.9 percentage point and 3.5 percentage point increase.   
The bivariate probit and two-stage least square estimation found that SHI’s impact on 
utilization was constrained to outpatient usage.  The two-stage least square estimation 
showed that people with SHI have an 81 percent increase in the likelihood of using 
outpatient care relative to those without SHI.  There was no evidence that SHI caused a 
substitution away from private providers in favor of public services.   It may have 
increased the use of private sector service delivery. 
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Table 3.4.  SHI impact on utilization 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  IP Public IP 
Private 
IP 
OP 
Public 
OP 
Private 
OP 
Bivariate Probit, marginal effects     
SHI 0.017 0.024 0.009 0.225* 0.155* 0.203* 
 (0.065) (0.039) (0.031) (0.091) (0.073) (0.083) 
N 4393 4393 4393 4393 4,393 4,393 
Probit, marginal effects      
SHI 0.036*** 0.020** 0.109** 0.048* 0.016* 0.035* 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) 
pseudo R-sq 0.092 0.070 0.127 0.030 0.040 0.030 
N 3999 3999 3847 3999 3999 3999 
Two-stage least squares      
SHI 0.111 0.141 0.066 0.810 * 0.236 0.689 
 (0.168) (0.123) (0.116) (0.412) (0.198) (0.370) 
N 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,171 4,171 
centered R-sq 0.032 -0.052 0.017 -0.395 -0.353 -0.010 
OLS       
SHI 0.0601*** 0.0288*** 0.0275*** 0.0460** 0.020* 0.0237 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.032) (0.017) 
N 4,287 4,285 4,285 4,287 4,287 4,287 
adj. R-sq 0.058 0.041 0.035 0.087 0.019 0.046 
Note: SE in parentheses 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Financial Protection 
The health reform had no impact on internationally accepted indicators of financial 
protection.  Using internationally accepted definitions of financial protection, the analysis 
used two measures of catastrophic health expenditures based on a 10 percent and 25 
percent threshold of spending on medical care as a share of total expenditures (a proxy 
for consumption).   An additional measure, the log of medical expenditures as a share of 
total per capita expenditures was used.   The models failed to reject exogeneity, implying 
the naïve probit and OLS models would be sufficient to estimate the impact of SHI on 
financial protection.  Except for the OLS specification for the log of the share of medical 
expenditures, the model specifications were unable to show a statistically significant 
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impact of health insurance on financial protection (see table 3.5).   The OLS estimate 
suggests that having SHI increases the share of medical spending by 1.2 percent. 
Table 3.5.   SHI impact on financial protection, naïve and IV results 
  (7) (8) (9) 
  Cat.  10%  Cat.  25%  
% 
expenditures 
on medical 
(log) 
Bivariate Probit average marginal effects   
SHI 0.147 0.083  
 (0.099) (0.092)  
N 4,393 4,393  
Probit marginal 
effects       
SHI 0.008 -0.003  
 (0.010) (0.005)  
N 4102 3,589  
Pseudo R-sq 0.0572 0.0831   
Two-stage least squares     
SHI -0.130 -0.031 -1.543 
 (0.183) (0.088) (1.430) 
N 4056 4056 3808 
uncentered R-sq 0.026 0.011 -0.024 
OLS    
SHI 0.010 -0.003 0.145* 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.087) 
N 4,171 4167 3911 
adj. R-sq 0.013 0.013 0.067 
Note: SE in parentheses 
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
 
Health outcomes 
Hausman specification tests for exogeneity were run for each of the two-stage least 
squares IV regressions.  The test statistic rejected the hypothesis of exogeneity at the 5 
percent level for all health outcome models except for hypertension, suggesting that SHI 
is endogenous for modeling hypertension but a naïve OLS is sufficient for estimating the 
impact of SHI on other health outcomes.  The only impact on health outcomes observed 
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came from the two-stage least squares analysis; the SHI improves the average 
performance on the sit-to-stand test.  Having social health insurance reduced the time it 
takes to get from sitting to standing by close to six seconds.  The corresponding OLS 
model, the preferred model given the results of the Hausman test, for the impact of SHI 
on the sit to stand test was not statistically significant.  We can rule out the possibility of 
large size effects given the lack of statistically significant impact across all the relevant 
models. 
Table 3.6.   SHI impact on health outcomes, naïve and IV results 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  Hypertension BMI 
Lung 
Capacity 
Grip 
strength 
Sit to 
Stand 
Bivariate probit marginal effect    
SHI 0.189     
 (0.197)     
N 4393     
Probit marginal effects         
SHI 0.016     
 (0.024)     
N 4498     
Pseudo R-sq 0.111         
Two-stage least squares     
SHI -0.358 -1.00 -3.778 4.077 -6.099* 
 (0.303) (3.66) (70.427) (5.701) (3.702) 
N 4152 4145 4130 4122 4052 
centered R-sq 0.0892 0.186 0.5114 0.5431 0.1176 
OLS           
SHI 0.0157 0.00381 -1.214 0.105 -0.152 
 (0.0230) (0.234) (4.407) (0.385) (0.181) 
N 4498 4279 4258 4251 4177 
R-sq 0.125 0.167 0.480 0.534 0.082 
 
Specification tests 
Tests for instrument strength were run on the IV estimation model for public outpatient 
utilization and the sit to stand health measure.   These looked at under-identification, 
weak identification using a Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic and a Sargan statistic for 
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overidentification.  Each test on each model found the instrument, participation in 
women’s association to be an adequate instrument for Social Health Insurance. 
Chiburis et at. (2011) recommend using the Murphy test which employs a Rao estimator 
for non-normality of error terms.  It rejects the model when there is excess kurtosis in the 
error distributions.  Battacharya et al. (2006), however, find the bivariate probit model 
robust to non-normality.   In some cases, the models were unable to pass Chiburis’s 
recommended Murphy tests6.  Corrective action, employed in the above models relied 
on boot-strapped standard errors to validate the statistical significance of the estimator. 
Private hospitals as a proxy for supply constraints 
To test if the major limiting factor to the effect of insurance on health care use, financial 
protection and health outcomes is Indonesia’s constrained supply, we use data 
produced by the Indonesian Ministry of Health on the availability of private hospitals in 
2016 by region.  This potentially serves as an exogenous indicator of Indonesia’s supply 
of health care, representing the attractiveness of a region to health care providers.  One 
caveat is that the available data are from 2016, two years after the health reform.  It is 
possible that private hospitals may have expanded in response to an increase in 
demand for health care services following the SHI reform.  Some private hospitals, 
following receipt of accreditation, are contracted with BPJS, the SHI agency.  A potential 
mitigating factor to this potential endogenous response to demand is the time lag 
required to construct a hospital.    Table 3.7 shows that the availability of private 
hospitals is associated with an increase in utilization of private services.   It also is 
associated with an increase in catastrophic health spending at the 10 percent level.    
                                                          
6 The Chiburis test on the models for private inpatient utilization, catastrophic health spending at the 25 
percent level, and hypertension failed to reject non-normality 
 
 
100 
 
Table 3.7.  The impact of private hospitals, marginal effects from the bivariate probit 
analysis 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
  IP Public IP Private IP OP Public OP Private OP 
Probit, Marginal Effects      
SHI 0.0324*** 0.0183*** 0.00870** 0.0413** 0.0139 0.0280* 
 (0.00541) (0.00375) (0.00313) (0.0158) (0.00773) (0.0143) 
       
Private 
hospital 
-3.43E-05 -4.70E-05 2.37E-05 0.000137* -2.63E-05 0.000193** 
 (2.36E-05) (1.63E-05) (1.13E-05) (5.69E-05) 
(2.90E-
05) 
(5.14E-05) 
N 4489 4486 4486 4489 4489 4489 
Pseudo R-sq 0.109 0.088 0.152 0.051 0.034 0.027 
Bivariate Probit, Marginal 
Effects 
     
SHI 0.0120 0.161** -.00189 0.0948 0.135 0.132 
 (0.0541) (0.0517) (0.0339) (0.138) (0.0698) (0.0879) 
       
Private 
hospital 
7.91E-07 -6.82E-05* 5.02E-05* 1.43E-04* -4.58E-05 2.17E-04*** 
 (3.19E-05) (3.27E-05) (3.01E-05) (6.17E-05) 
(3.79E-
05) 
(5.34E-05) 
N 4384 4643 4643 4384 4384 4384 
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  (7b) (8b) (9b)   
  Cat. 10% Cat. 25% 
Medical 
expenditures as 
% of household 
spending 
  
Bivariate Probit, Marginal Effects     
SHI 0.0825 -0.0458    
 (0.0874) (0.0803)    
      
Private hospital 1.02E-04** 6.58E-05    
 (3.73E-05) (6.34E-05)    
N 4384 4384    
Ordinary Least Squares     
SHI   0.110   
   (0.0839)   
Private hospital      
   0.00161***   
   (2.63E-04)   
N   4209   
R-squared   0.037   
      
      
  (10b) (11b) (12b) (13b) (14b) 
  Hypertension BMI Lung capacity 
Grip 
Strength 
Sit to Stand 
Bivariate Probit, Marginal effects     
SHI      
 0.304***     
 (0.0735)     
Private hospital      
 1.48E-04*     
 (6.28E-05)     
N 4.49E+03     
Ordinary Least Squares     
SHI 0.0144 -0.00795 -1.127 0.108 -0.167 
 (0.0231) (0.233) (4.424) (0.384) (0.180) 
      
Private hospital 0.000152* 0.00197* -0.0503*** 0.00363** 0.00322*** 
 (7.67E-05) (0.000776) (0.0145) (0.00120) (0.000820) 
      
N 4487 4270 4249 4243 4169 
R-squared 0.125 0.169 0.481 0.535 0.088 
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When including private hospitals in measuring SHI’s impact on health outcomes, it 
shows that SHI potentially has a causal effect on increasing hypertension rates.  This 
could be due to SHI increasing access to health care services that would diagnose for 
hypertension. 
When including the private hospital variable in the IV estimation strategy, the Hausman 
test failed to reject the null hypothesis that SHI can be treated as exogeneous, 
suggesting that OLS estimation would be adequate for estimating the impact of SHI on 
continuous financial protection and health outcomes. 
Propensity score matching with Difference in Difference Analysis 
The PSM DD longitudinal analysis used the 2007/08 and the 2015 portion of the IFLS IV 
and V panels, respectively.  The control group individuals included those who had no 
health insurance in both the IFLS IV and IFLS V panels.  The treatment group 
represented those who had no health insurance in the IFLS IV panel but gained 
insurance in the IFLS V panel.  With this constraint on the sample, a total of 3,936 
individuals with matched data were identified.  The PSM DD analysis showed that the 
social health insurance reform resulted in an increase in utilization across inpatient and 
outpatient services.  Despite the increase in the rate of catastrophic health spending 
observed between 2007 and 2015, there was no impact of SHI on catastrophic health 
spending.  The rate of catastrophic health spending increased evenly between those 
who had SHI and those who did not.  The impact on health outcomes was limited.   The 
SHI was associated with a statistically significant increase in the time it takes to stand 
from a sitting position. 
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Table 3.8:  Propensity score matching with difference in difference analysis 
   𝛿  (Percentage Points) 
SE 
(pp) N 
Health care utilization 
   
    Inpatient utilization 7.6*** 1.1        7,901 
    Public inpatient utilization 3.9*** 0.7        7,560  
    Private inpatient utilization 3.0*** 0.9        7,560  
    Outpatient utilization 7.9*** 1.8        7,600 
    Public outpatient utilization 3.5*** 0.9        7,557  
    Private outpatient utilization 2.4* 1.4        7,557  
Financial protection    
    Catastrophic health 
expenditure,  > 10% of total 
expenditure 
0.7 1.1 7,600 
    Catastrophic health 
expenditure, > 25% of total 
expenditure 
-0.2 0.6 7,901 
     Health expenditures as a % 
of total expenditures (log 
difference) 
0.320 0.277 7,655 
Health outcomes    
    Hypertension rate 0.8 2.3        7,544  
  𝛿  (health unit) 
SE 
(pp) N 
    BMI (kg/m2) -0.112 0.216        7,410  
    Lung capacity (mm HG) -1.561 4.800        7,403  
    Grip strength (kg) 0.042 0.474        7,378  
    Sit to stand (seconds) 0.291** 0.147        7,179  
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
Parallel trend assumptions 
A visual inspection of the parallel trend assumptions to see how the reform may have 
differentially impacted those with social health insurance compared to those without 
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social health insurance is presented in figure 1.   It uses panels III, IV and V from the 
analysis.  There is a seven-year gap between panel years, which means that other 
sectoral reforms may differentially impact the outcome variables of interest.   Between 
2000 and 2007, Indonesia underwent a few health care reforms.  As chapter I detailed, 
the Asian Financial Crisis prompted sectoral reforms beginning in 2000, including the 
devolution of health services in 2001 and the introduction of Askeskin which expanded 
health insurance for the poor.   The analysis removed those who enrolled in the 
Askeskin program but non-parallel differences between the control (NO SHI) and 
treatment (SHI) groups may persist due to the impact of the 2000 and 2007 health 
reforms.  Except for figure 1b, the treatment and control groups seem imperfectly parallel 
between the 2000 and 2007 panel years.  There is also a dip in outpatient utilization in 
public facilities and relatively flat difference in utilization rates at other types of facilities 
between 2000 and 2007 among the uninsured.  The Asian Financial Crisis could 
potentially explain the different trend in utilization which caused those without insurance 
to limit the resources needed to use health care services, relative to those with 
insurance.  The parallel trend in inpatient usage between those with and without SHI 
may reflect the lack of discretion when faced with serious health shocks that require care 
at inpatient facilities.   
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Figure 3.1.  Parallel Trend graphs 
Figure 3.1a.  Inpatient utilization 
 
Figure 3.1b.  Inpatient utilization, public 
facilities 
 
Figure 3.1c.  Inpatient utilization, private 
facilities 
 
Figure 3.1d.  Outpatient utilization 
 
Figure 3.1e.  Outpatient utilization, public 
facilities 
 
Figure 3.1f.  Outpatient utilization, private
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3.6. Discussion 
This chapter examined the impact of the SHI reform in health care utilization, financial 
protection, and health outcomes.   It used naïve models that treated SHI as exogenous 
and models (bivariate probit and two-stage least squares) that treated SHI as 
endogenous.  Naïve models show a statistically significant increase in utilization at 
inpatient and outpatient, public and private facilities.  But the results of the two-stage 
least squares and bivariate probit analyses, which treat social health insurance as an 
endogenous regressor, showed that the impact was limited to outpatient utilization.   The 
observed increase in the naïve models of health care utilization may be a result of 
selection issues.  The PSM DD model which controls for time-invariant factors also 
found social health insurance to have a positive impact on all measures of utilization 
except for private outpatient usage.   A potential flaw in the PSM DD model is the 
possibility that adverse selection behavior is time varying.  That is, health risks may 
change as people age and therefore, the resulting selection tendencies change 
accordingly.     
The comparison of the different models for assessing the causal impact of SHI on 
utilization serves as a cautionary tale for the over-interpretation of the SHI’s immediate 
impact on health care utilization.   SHI has most likely only resulted in an increase in use 
of outpatient facilities.   We can rule out the possibility of large size effects from the SHI 
on other measured outcomes from the first year of expansion because of the small and 
mostly non-statistically significant findings across the model specifications.     
These results are consistent with expectations about the incentives driving outpatient 
usage.  Individuals have less discretionary control over their inpatient usage.  The SHI 
employs a gatekeeping system managed by primary health care facilities that would limit 
use of inpatient facilities without proper referral.  More likely, individuals who frequently 
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use inpatient facilities are more likely to enroll, as indicated in the probit analysis in 
chapter I and in naïve model estimates in chapter III.   But there is no indication that the 
SHI had a negative impact on private outpatient care, which is not as widely covered 
relative to the public sector.  Indonesians, in general prefer private health care providers, 
particularly at the outpatient level.  As table 3.1 shows, fifteen percent of Indonesians 
reported visiting a private outpatient provider whereas only five percent reported visiting 
a public outpatient provider in the four weeks prior to being surveyed. There was no 
indication that the public sector crowded out the private sector but it is possible that 
increased public sector usage generated demand for the private sector.  That is, it is 
possible that dual practice physicians were increasing self-referrals to their private 
outpatient practice.    
The reform did not have a statistically significant impact on internationally recognized 
measures of catastrophic health expenditures; it did increase health spending as a share 
of total per capita consumption and limited impact on health outcomes.  This is 
consistent with results from analyses that have relied on observational data to analyze 
the impact of health financing reforms on utilization, financial protection and health 
outcomes.    Most studies have found that UHC schemes impact usage but have mixed 
impact on financial protection or health outcomes (Giedion et al. 2011).   In Indonesia’s 
case, the lack of impact on catastrophic spending and health outcomes could be due to 
several factors.  First, the reform only measures the impact after one year of 
implementation so there may not be sufficient time to see the full impact of the reform.   
Second, the measures of financial protection and health indicators may not be adequate 
indicators of relevant health outcomes.  Third, the reform may not be designed to 
adequately address the country’s health system bottlenecks.   Fourth, the SHI may have 
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effectively protected against financial exposure that resulted from the observed increase 
in health care utilization.  We address the second, third, and fourth points below. 
Addressing financial barriers at the service delivery level may not be a relevant indicator 
in Indonesia.  Health spending is low; Indonesians spend about 2.3 percent of their total 
expenditures (or 3 percent of GDP) on health.  Major financial costs such as transport 
costs or lost work time spent seeking health care are not captured in this analysis nor in 
global indicators of financial protection.   Also, out of pocket costs are only relevant if 
individuals decide to use health care.  Sick Indonesians who do not use health care will 
not incur health care costs and financial protection indicators would not capture that 
behavior.   Health spending as a share of total consumption rose slightly for those with 
health insurance; consistent with findings by Wagstaff et al. (2009) in Vietnam, where 
health spending increased.  SHI creates a demand effect for health care use and 
therefore, may stimulate individual health care spending, as demonstrated by the slight 
increase in medical spending as a share of total expenditures.    
The health outcome measurements capture age progression and diseases of wealth.  
Indonesia has a dual burden of disease, in that it suffers from causes of death and 
morbidity found in both developed and developing countries.  It has high rates of 
tuberculosis and infant mortality, which were the third and fifth causes of premature 
death in 2016, respectively (IHME 2018).   Yet, rates of ischemic heart disease, 
cerebrovascular disease, and diabetes are growing and lead the causes of premature 
death in Indonesia (IHME 2018).  The key indicator in this analysis, hypertension may be 
an adequate measure of the impact of the reform on the chronic diseases, but the 
analysis fails to measure the impact of the reform on high incidence infectious diseases 
or maternal and child health issues common in low income countries.   
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There are multiple bottlenecks within Indonesia’s complex health system.  The overall 
supply of quality health care workers and facilities is limited and unevenly distributed 
across the country.   Indonesia has about 1.3 hospital beds and 1.8 health workers per 
1,000 population but most are concentrated in urban areas (Mahendradhata et al. 2017).   
By comparison, most middle-income countries have an average of 2.2 hospital beds per 
1,000 population and the WHO recommended a minimum of 2.3 health workers per 
1,000 population to meet the health MDGs (World Bank 2018; WHO 2018).  Some 
hospitals and primary care facilities still lack consistent access to clean water and 
electricity; for example, about one-quarter of hospitals in North Sulawesi were lacking 
(Mahendradhata et al. 2017).   We introduced regional private hospital variation as a 
proxy measure of supply side constraints.  This measure did not improve health 
outcomes.  This indicator, however, may not have been an adequate exogenous 
indicator of health care supply; the data was from 2016, two years following the reform.  
Given that some private hospitals are empaneled providers of the SHI, it is possible that 
there may be an endogenous private hospital supply response to the introduction of SHI.   
It also does not provide an indicator of service quality. 
The service quality is limited, suggesting that seeking health care is not necessarily 
health improving.  In 2011, about 51 percent of public hospitals were accredited with a 
national requirement that assesses a hospital’s ability to deliver a wide range of services 
at an appropriate level of quality (Mahendradhata et al. 2017).  Assessments of service 
readiness in primary health care facilities assessed competency of health care providers 
through diagnostic vignettes on patients coming for antenatal care, child curative care 
services, and diabetes care.  Vignette scores in the IFLS IV and IFLS East panels 
indicated low diagnostic capability.  Fewer than 45 percent of providers tested were able 
to adequately diagnose the health care disease of interest (Mahendradhata et al. 2017).   
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The additional financing from the SHI is channeled in a specific way to primary health 
care facilities, that is not adequate to address the supply side constraints addressed 
above.  First, civil service health care providers are still paid a salary and there are few 
pay-for-performance financing mechanisms that create incentives to deliver quality care; 
although, the SHI has started to pilot a way of linking incentives to provider performance. 
The SHI pays primary care providers on a capitated basis for “personal health services 
that are non-specialty, first-level observation and diagnosis, primary health care and 
treatment, and/or other health services” (Mahendrahata et al. 2017).  There are, 
however, restrictions on the use of these funds.  For example, they cannot be used to 
fund capital costs.   
While health care utilization increased, the rate of catastrophic health spending did not 
worsen.  This could be indicative of a protective effect of the SHI on health care 
spending.  In the absence of SHI, an increase in health care utilization would be 
expected to increase the level of health care spending and consequently increase the 
risk of catastrophic health spending.   
The nascent SHI reform introduced policies that redressed some of the financial barriers 
to health care utilization but thus far, it has not overcome health care quality issues to 
strengthen the link between health care usage and improvement in health outcomes.  
The largely input-based system of health care financing limits the use of incentives to 
drive provider performance.  The capitation payments to primary care providers take 
steps to improve.  Provider payment reforms within the SHI reimbursement system are 
still ongoing and as they evolve, have the potential to contribute to strengthening the 
delivery of quality services.  Further work is needed to study how ongoing reforms to 
provider payment mechanisms (such as the revision to the DRG system in hospitals or 
performance- based financing pilots) impact provider behavior and subsequently quality 
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of care and health outcomes.  Without an obvious link between health care access and 
health outcomes, the return on investment for members of the informal sector to enroll in 
health insurance is limited, contributing to the “missing middle” problem and limiting 
Indonesia’s progress toward achieving UHC. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Policy discussion 
 
The government of Indonesia aims to achieve Universal Health Coverage by 2019 
through the consolidation of fragmented schemes and the expansion of coverage to 
nonpoor informal sector populations through partially subsidized premiums.  In doing so, 
Indonesia faces a challenge common to developing countries of trying to cover its large 
informal sector population.  Based on data through 2015, we analyze multiple 
dimensions of this coverage problem and discuss what can be done to increase 
meaningful coverage in the most effective or efficient way.  Chapter One, in the absence 
of data on price variation, looked at the non-price determinants of enrollment for the 
large informal sector population to help understand why less than 19 percent of the 
nonpoor informal sector are enrolled in SHI.  Chapter Two analyzed the social health 
insurance reform’s impact on the formal sector labor market.  It describes some of the 
challenges with the Social Health Insurance (SHI) system’s resource mobilization 
strategy.  Chapter Three looked at the health utilization, financial protection, and health 
outcome impacts among the nonpoor informal sector to understand the value of 
insurance to the nonpoor informal sector.  This chapter briefly summarizes the findings 
from the three chapters and describes policy recommendations to address problems 
with partial population coverage and SHI deficits.  Short of enhanced resource 
mobilization to finance more generous subsidies, we describe policy recommendations 
that focus on strengthening SHI design features and discuss multi-sectoral and health 
system investments that can impact enrollment, usage, financial protection, and health 
outcomes.   
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Overview of the reform 
Indonesia’s SHI reform in 2014 consolidated fragmented risk pools under one 
purchasing entity and mandated enrollment for all Indonesians including a new eligibility 
category, the nonpoor informal sector.   It expanded subsidies for the near poor 
populations through general revenue financing sources, unified the payroll tax for formal 
sector populations into one rate irrespective of marital status, and opened enrollment for 
the nonpoor informal sector through a nationally defined, tiered premiums rates that vary 
based on hospital class.  It offers a generous benefits packages with a small negative list 
and few cost-sharing requirements.   It also empanels all public providers and select 
private hospitals and primary care providers. 
Indonesia’s current policy features and large informal sector make it unlikely that it will 
be able to achieve universal coverage by 2019 or reduce its SHI deficits.  The informal 
sector is large and depending on data source, comprises up to 70 percent of the 
population.  Population coverage among the nonpoor informal sector is low.  Only about 
13 percent of the total nonpoor informal sector population was enrolled in the SHI in 
2015 and due to limited enforcement capacity, this group may continue to have the 
lowest levels of insurance coverage.   
Delivering the generous benefits package with minimal cost-sharing is difficult given the 
current low levels of total health care spending and constrained supply (e.g. limited 
human resources for health).  Constrained resources on the health sector may be 
resulting in implicit rationing in the form of long wait times (GHT 2017).   
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Summary of key findings 
Absent sufficient data on the variation in premium prices and benefits received, we 
looked at the non-price determinants of uptake on SHI in chapter One using the fifth 
panel of the Indonesia Family Life Survey.  SHI enrollment among the nonpoor informal 
sector is low.  Key characteristics that influence enrollment uptake among this group 
include the role of education and literacy, living in a rural area, participation in women’s 
association activities, household consumption, chronic illness, and the use of self-
treatment and traditional care.  These findings are consistent with other observational 
studies that have looked at factors that influence insurance uptake in Indonesia.  
Premium pricing policy could potentially also impact uptake in SHI enrollment but other 
policies that could facilitate enrollment include addressing the 1) the multi-sectoral 
aspect (i.e. education) of insurance uptake, and 2) supply side issues (rural consumption 
and the lack of inclusion of services that affect traditional care). 
In chapter Two, we began to examine the impact of expansion of the social health 
insurance system on informalization by using propensity score matching with difference 
in difference on Sakernas, August panels from 2011 to 2015.   In theory, the social 
health insurance reform in Indonesia potentially created incentives to informalize by 
breaking the tax/benefit linkage experienced by formal sector employees and increasing 
the payroll tax for unmarried workers.  The analysis employed in chapter Two exploits 
the differential change in the payroll tax for unmarried and married workers, to identify 
the impact of the SHI reform on informalization.   Given that the reform was implemented 
nationally, we are unable to evaluate any impact on informalization that could have 
resulted from a break in the tax/benefit linkage.     
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During the time period studied, overall informal sector employment decreased and 
formal sector wages increased.   The reform’s increase in the payroll tax is associated 
with a 1.6 percentage point increase in informal employment for unmarried men, relative 
to the counterfactual.  That is, the reform depressed the positive trend toward 
formalization among unmarried men.  It had no observed wage or informal employment 
effects on the overall working population within the first two years of the reform.   Other 
studies that have examined the impact of SHI have found that SHI led to an increase in 
informalization between 0.6 and 17 percentage points.  By comparison, the Indonesian 
SHI reform had an impact that was not as detrimental to the rate of formalization.   
Chapter Three looked at the impact of the SHI on health utilization, financial protection, 
and health outcomes.  It deployed both naïve models and models that treated SHI as 
endogenous using the Indonesia Family Life Survey.  It showed that SHI enrollment for 
the nonpoor informal sector resulted in an increase mainly in outpatient utilization.  
Medical spending as a share of total household expenditures increased slightly.  There 
were statistically significant reductions in the rate of catastrophic health spending.  Given 
the increase in utilization, the slight increase in health spending without an impact on 
catastrophic health spending at the 10 and 25 percent thresholds may be an indicative of 
some financial protection effect. There was no statistically significant improvement in 
overall health outcomes.  When controlling for private hospital usage, the rate of 
hypertension for those with SHI increased.  It is possible that SHI increases utilization 
which could in turn, increase the likelihood of being diagnosed with hypertension. 
The analysis suggests that some progress toward sustainably realizing Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) could include a mix of long- and short-term policy reforms: non-health 
sector reforms that enhance public sector revenues and expand the size of the formal 
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sector; multi-sectoral policies that strengthen the demand for health insurance and 
improve the quality of service delivery; and revisions to insurance plan features that 
rationalize health care benefits, reform the provider payment mechanisms, and include 
new cost-sharing measures.   
Policy recommendations:  Addressing deficits and population coverage 
The Indonesian government’s aspirational objective of achieving universal health 
coverage by 2019 is unlikely to be achieved under the current policy.  Enhancing 
population coverage while addressing deficits would require policies that focus on 
greater resource mobilization overall, and in particular for the health sector.   The 
government of Indonesia, with technical assistance from the World Bank and IMF, has 
been trying to improve tax administration and compliance to increase domestic 
resources that could be used to finance critical social investments such as the UHC 
reform.   
A full or more generous subsidy for the entire informal sector would likely enhance 
insurance coverage rates. But even under the current mix of revenue sources, the SHI 
faces continuing and growing deficits.  We are unable to determine the budget 
implications of introducing a full subsidy for the entire informal sector without information 
on the marginal costs to the SHI system of enrollment.  Adverse selection may be driving 
the high costs of the enrolled nonpoor informal sector given their higher likelihood of 
being sick, as indicated by their higher levels of chronic illness.  Chapter One showed 
that having a chronic illness increased the probability of enrollment in SHI among the 
studied population: on average, 43 percent of the nonpoor informal sector with SHI 
report having at least one chronic illness compared to 29 percent without SHI.    Chapter 
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Three showed that SHI enrollment increased the average probability of outpatient 
utilization by 13.9 percentage points.  Based on the estimates of SHI spending on the 
currently enrolled nonpoor SHI in table 1.2, we can estimate the upper limit required to 
fully subsidize the nonpoor informal sector.  The government would need to finance at 
most US$ 6.6 billion7 or 60 percent of total government health spending in 2015 if it were 
to fully subsidize the nonpoor informal sector’s health insurance coverage.  This 
accounts for six percent of total government revenue and would require an increase in 
the tax collection rate from 10.7 percent of GDP to 11.4 percent of GDP. 
It could be possible to better align policies to enhance resource mobilization for the 
government and the health sector.  The main sources of financing for the SHI are the 
payroll tax which finances SHI for the formal sector, general revenues to finance 
subsidies for the poor/near poor, and contributory financing for the nonpoor informal 
sector.  The exact mix of these revenues in Indonesia is unclear.  But table 1.2 suggests 
that more than half of SHI revenues come from general revenue financing, 43 percent of 
SHI revenues from payroll tax contributions, and only 5 percent from the contributory 
collections.  The overall government is financed mainly through consumption taxes 
(VAT, luxury, excise, and tobacco) which account for 34 percent of revenues, income tax 
(25 percent personal and 75 percent corporate tax) which accounts for 29 percent of 
revenues, and oil and gas revenues which account for 20 percent of revenues 
(Mahendradhata et al. 2017).    Consumption taxes, particularly the VAT and tobacco 
taxes, are mechanisms that can be used to broaden the tax base, albeit through 
potentially regressive means.  The personal income tax only accounts for a small portion 
                                                          
7 Based on table 1.2 estimates, which shows that the average cost of currently enrolled nonpoor informal 
sector insured is US$5.3 per capita per month and 103,125,785 Indonesians fall into this category. 
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of overall government revenues (7 percent) and our analysis showed that the payroll tax 
change resulting from the health insurance reform has not had a major impact on 
reducing the rate of formalization.  The current payroll tax may be an effective means for 
financing the formal sector’s health care needs.   Distortions of the payroll tax may be 
minimal relative to other regulatory burdens on the formal sector (i.e. the minimum wage 
laws and the Manpower law).  This type of analysis is outside the scope of this research.  
Future work is needed to examine the current approach to tax policy and administration 
reform and examine the overall burden of taxation on the formal sector within the context 
of other regulatory burdens.    
Expanding reliance on the payroll tax to finance formal sector social protection 
mechanisms runs counter to guidance provided by the IMF.  The latter has 
recommended that Indonesia expand its tax base and improve compliance of its existing 
taxes and enhancing tax administration.  According to the IMF, this could potentially 
increase the country’s tax revenues by three percent of GDP in five years (IMF 2018).  
This would provide greater fiscal space to finance investments in the social sector, 
including social protection mechanisms like the UHC reform.   The lack of progress on 
improving tax administration and compliance, however, suggests otherwise.  Despite 
ongoing reforms, Indonesia saw a decline of a half percent in its tax revenue as a share 
of GDP between 2016 and 2017 (World Bank 2018). 
Policies to expand the relative size of the formal sector should be further explored, since 
these could also likely benefit progress toward UHC.  There are still structural barriers 
that limit the expansion of the formal sector such as strengthened minimum wage laws 
that took effect in 2016 and the Manpower law that restricts firing practices.   The 
imposition of health insurance-related payroll taxes may have a minimal impact on 
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incentives to informalize relative to the overall set of payroll taxes and other regulatory 
barriers.   Investments in education have the knock-on effect of improving the 
understanding of the value of health insurance and health care, improving the skill set 
desired by the formal sector, and potentially strengthening the investments in service 
delivery quality (through education of health professionals).   
In looking at the impact of SHI on health utilization, financial protection, and health 
outcomes, chapter Three asked whether buying health insurance is “worth it” for the 
remaining uninsured nonpoor informal sector in terms of health care utilization, financial 
protection, and health outcomes.  There has been no obvious improvement from SHI 
shown in health outcomes and financial protection for the insured as a result of the 
reform.  Financial protection indicators may not be a relevant indicator for Indonesians 
given the low rates of health care usage and health care spending.  Our analysis 
showed that health insurance potentially increases spending on health care which could 
be a critical way of providing more resources to the overall health system and indicative 
of greater investment in individual health. 
Although our use of regional availability of private hospitals did not prove that there were 
supply constraints, supply constraints may still be a major driver for the limited 
improvements seen.  Further investigation into supply constraints is needed to 
understand whether direct investments into supply inputs (e.g. quality improvement and 
number of health care providers and infrastructure) would enhance demand for health 
care and insurance, as well as improve health outcomes.     
Insurance plan features, revisions and future direction 
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This section briefly describes how potential and ongoing changes in social health 
insurance plan features could affect problems related to expanding coverage, growing 
deficits, and limited impact on health outcomes. 
Revenue collection 
SHI deficits in Indonesia doubled from US$ 224 million in 2014 to US$ 426 million in 
2015 (Diela 2016).  In response, the government increased 2016 premium levels for the 
nonpoor informal sector.  Class III premiums increased from Rp 25,500 (US$ 1.9) to Rp 
30,000 (US$ 2.2).  Class II premiums increased from Rp 42,500 (US$ 3) to Rp 51,000 
(US$ 3.7).  Class I premiums increased from Rp 59,500 (US$ 4.3) to Rp 80,000 (US$ 
5.8) (Diela 2016).   Although our analysis was unable to estimate premium price-
responsiveness, we can assume that the increase in premium levels will not improve 
coverage rates.  If adverse selection was driving only the sickest patients to enroll, then 
the increase in premium could result in a contraction in coverage rates.   
The SHI payer’s ability to enforce the enrollment mandate could potentially mitigate 
some of the contraction from the premium hikes.  Nevertheless, there is little information 
on the effectiveness of enforcement, and mandates for employees and micro-enterprises 
did not come into effect until after the period studied.  Penalties are imposed on those 
whose premium payments lapse after a month and subsequently seek care at an in-
patient facility.  The penalty is calculated based on the number of months in inactive 
insurance membership times the treatment costs times 2.5 percent.  The maximum 
penalty is up to 12 months or Rp 30 million (US$ 2,100), whichever is lower (Expat Indo 
2018).  Based on average nonpoor informal sector wages (US$ 86/month) and average 
public inpatient treatment costs (US$ 118/visit) this could result in a potential average 
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penalty of US$ 35, or less than half of monthly informal sector per capita expenditure.   
This could potentially be an effective way of enforcing the collection of penalties, given 
the inability to enforce penalties through taxes across the informal sector.  More 
research is needed to monitor how well these mandates are enforced and whether they 
influence enrollment. 
Cost-sharing requirements 
The Indonesian health benefits package was very generous. It was intended to include 
infectious diseases, open-heart surgery, dialysis, and cancer therapies provided by 
health care providers contracted with the BPJS Kesahatan.  In addition, several services 
were excluded including the following: 1) services abroad, 2) services to conceive a 
child, 3) service for beauty purposes, 4) addiction treatment, and 5) alternative medicine.  
While there were initially no cost-sharing requirements, revisions increased the ceiling 
for hearing aids, eyeglasses and wheelchairs.  For eyeglasses, the 2017 ceiling is US$ 
15; for US$ 70 every 5 years for hearing aids; and US$1,750 every 5 years for 
wheelchairs. 
 
Policymakers may wish to consider introducing further cost sharing requirements, given 
low health care spending levels and low rates of catastrophic health spending.  
Indonesians already spend very little on health care and (arguably) under-utilize health 
care services.  The introduction of social health insurance created a demand stimulus for 
health care services, without imposing any restrictions to address potential moral hazard 
problems.  These cost-sharing requirements were imposed based on eligibility class, 
with exemptions for the fully subsidized poor/near poor individuals, yet the remaining two 
eligibility groups should be considered.  At present, Ministry of Health regulations forbid 
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the use of co-payments and the imposition of an upper ceiling on health care services 
consistent with protocol guidelines.  Regulations that control cost-sharing and benefits 
packages would need to be revised to allow for these adjustments. 
In conjunction with introducing a cost-sharing requirement, benefits packages could be 
redesigned to incorporate cost-effectiveness and focus on priority health care services.   
The Ministry of Health has worked to develop a nascent network of institutions that can 
conduct health technology assessments (HTAs) to inform decisions on what medicines, 
equipment, procedures, or diagnostics would be covered under the SHI (Mahendradhata 
et al. 2017).  The wider usage of HTAs has the potential to inform the expansion of 
negative lists or designing cost-sharing requirements that incentivize the use of high 
value care.  HTAs have thus far not been widely deployed: only two cost-utility analyses 
have been produced by the Ministry of Health’s HTA network.  It may take a while before 
HTAs are scaled up sufficiently enough to inform a major benefit package redesign.  
There may be political ramifications from withdrawing currently eligible benefits which 
may limit the appetite for narrowing benefit packages and introducing cost sharing 
requirements.  Decisionmakers will need to weigh technical considerations against 
political pushback in the expansion of cost sharing or negative lists.     
 
Provider payment reforms 
The way that additional financing from the SHI is currently channeled to primary health 
care facilities limits its effectiveness to address the supply side constraints discussed 
above.  First, civil service health care providers are still paid salaries and there are few 
pay-for-performance financing mechanisms creating incentives to deliver quality care, 
though the SHI has started to pilot linking incentives to provider performance. The SHI 
pays primary care providers on a capitated basis for “personal health services that are 
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non-specialty, first-level observation and diagnosis, primary health care and treatment, 
and/or other health services” (Mahendrahata et al. 2017).   Most empaneled primary 
care providers are puskesmas or public clinics.   Private hospitals and primary care 
facilities can be licensed to contract with BPJS through a credentialing system for a year 
at a time (Mahendrahata et al. 2017). While many private hospitals are empaneled by 
the SHI, it’s not clear how widely the government contracts with private primary care 
providers or practitioners of traditional medicine.  Indonesians prefer private over public 
primary care, visiting a private outpatient facility three times more often than a public 
facility.  Most private health services are paid through OOP spending (Mahendradhata et 
al. 2017).  Self-treatment is also an issue, where Indonesians can purchase prescription 
drugs at unlicensed drug sellers (World Bank 2009). Use of traditional medicine is also 
commonplace; 19 percent of nonpoor informal sector Indonesians reported using 
traditional medicine.  Without these types of providers and services in the benefits 
package, the nonpoor informal sector may decide that the SHI does not meet their 
health care needs.  The inclusion of these types of providers and services to attract new 
enrollees would need to be weighed against the additional costs to the benefits 
packages.  The cost considerations would not be limited to the additional cost of 
services and needs to consider the additional oversight and transaction costs from 
contracting with these providers.  Additionally, there is less information on the service 
quality so there may be limited information to inform a cost-effectiveness argument for 
inclusion of these additional providers and services.   
The largely input-based system8 of health care financing limits in Indonesia the use of 
incentives to drive provider performance.  Capitation payments to primary care providers 
                                                          
8 Salaries, commodities, and capital investments of public facilities are centrally funded. 
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may improve the provider incentive environment, yet provider payment reforms within 
the SHI reimbursement system are still nascent. As they evolve, they have the potential 
to contribute to strengthening the delivery of quality services.  Further work is needed to 
study how ongoing reforms to provider payment mechanisms (such as the revision to the 
DRG system in hospitals or performance-based financing pilots) would impact provider 
behavior, along with quality of care and health outcomes.  Without an obvious link 
between health care access and health outcomes, the return on investment for members 
of the informal sector to enroll in health insurance is limited, contributing to the “missing 
middle” problem and limiting Indonesia’s progress toward achieving UHC. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure 3.2.  Propensity score balance 
 Figure 2a.  Inpatient 
utilization 
 
 
Figure 2b.  Inpatient 
utilization, public facilities 
 
Figure 2c.  Inpatient 
utilization, private facilities 
 
Figure 2d.  Outpatient 
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Figure 2e.  Outpatient 
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